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ABSTRACT 
 
TURKISH-ISRAELI ENTENTE: THE IMPACT OF TURKISH-ISRAELI 
ALIGNMENT ON TURKISH-IRANIAN RELATIONS 
 
BİLGİN, VELİ 
 
M.A., Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Nur Bilge Criss 
April 2004 
 
 
This thesis analyzes the Turkish-Israeli relations, which reached an apex 
with the 1996 military agreement respectively for both countries. Whether this 
cooperation is an alliance will be discussed.  In the press and in some certain 
academic circles it is argued that Turkish-Israeli alignment would harm Turkey’s 
relations with its other Middle Eastern neighbors and it would cause an isolation of 
Turkey in the region. While Turkish-Israeli alignment can be deemed as a effect of 
evolving Turkish foreign policy toward the Middle East in the post-Cold war era 
depending on its shifting threat perceptions, this alignment is far from being depicted 
as an alliance. Apart from targeting a third state, PKK (Partiye Karkaren Kürdistan) 
terrorism constituted the main motivation of the alignment. On the other hand, 
including from the Kurdish and Palestinian issues, Turkey and Israel lacked accord 
on many critical topics. In contemporary multipolar world order Turkey’s 
maintaining relations with its neighbors despite the fluctuations, traditional Turkish 
foreign policy which oppose polarization in the Middle East are significant factors 
that obstruct an alliance type relation between Turkey and Israel.  
 
Keywords: Alliance Theories, Turkish-Israeli Alignment, Multipolarity, Middle East, 
Iran, Weapons of Mass Destructions, PKK. 
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ÖZET 
TÜRKİYE-İSRAİL ANTANTI: TÜRKİYE -İSRAİL İŞBİRLİĞİ’NİN TÜRKİYE-
İRAN İLİŞKİLERİ’NE ETKİSİ 
 
BİLGİN, VELİ 
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
Tez Danışmanı: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Nur Bilge Criss 
Nisan 2004 
 
Bu tezde 1996 yılındaki askeri işbirliği antlaşmasıyla doruğa ulaşan Türk-
İsrail ilişkilerinin iki ülke açısından değerlendirmesi yapılarak, oluşan işbirliğinin bir 
ittifak olup olmadığı incelenecektir. Basında ve çeşitli akademik çevrelerde Türk-
İsrail işbirliğinin Türkiye’nin Ortadoğu’daki diğer komşularıyla olan ilişkilerini 
zedeleyeceği ve Türkiye’yi bölgede bir kamplaşma sürecine itebileceği öne sürülmüş 
ve İran işbirliğinin hedefi olarak gösterilmiştir. Her ne  kadar Türk-İsrail işbirliği 
Türkiye’nin Soğuk Savaş sonrasında tehdit algılamalarına bağlı olarak Ortadoğu’da 
değişen ve aktifleşen dış politikasının bir yansıması olarak algılanabilirse de, bu 
işbirliği ittifak olarak adlandırılamayacak niteliktedir. Bir devletin hedef alınmasının 
ötesinde PKK terörizmi işbirliğinin en önemli maddesidir. Kürt meselesi ve Filistin 
sorunu başta olmak üzere iki ülke pek çok konuda ayrılık halindedir. Ayrıca, her iki 
ülkenin coğrafyası, demografik yapısı, dinsel faktörleri ve kültürleri Ortadoğu’da bir 
ittifak oluşturarak kamplaşmaya neden olmalarına engel olmaktadır. Çok kutuplu 
yeni dünya düzeninde Türkiye’nin bölge ülkeleriyle ve komşularıyla geçmişe 
dayanan ve iniş çıkışlarına rağmen süreklilik arz eden özel ilişkileri, Ortadoğu’da 
kutuplaşmaya karşı olan geleneksel Türk dış politikası Türk-İsrail işbirliğinin ittifak 
olarak değerlendirilmesinin önündeki önemli etmenlerdir. 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: İttifak Teorileri, Türk-İsrail İşbirliği, Çok kutupluluk, Ortadoğu, 
İran, Kitle İmha Silahları,PKK. 
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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The end of the Cold war and the break-up the Soviet Union made Turkey face 
new conditions both in the international and in regional domains. It would not be 
wrong to argue that international and national politics have been increasingly shaped 
by regional as well as sub-regional and local dynamics with the demise of bipolarity. 
We are approaching a new world order in which none of the states does not have 
adequate power to tackle intra-state, inter-state, regional and international matters. In 
this picture the Middle East region, absolutely spearheaded by the post-Cold war 
policy-making in global terms with its potential & present energy resources, peace 
processes, and religious and ideological discrepancies. Developments in the Middle 
East have inevitable impacts for regional states as well. Turkey, unavoidably, has 
been affected by developments in the region in that Ankara shifted its threat 
perceptions from the north to south, which led to re-orientate its foreign policy 
towards the Middle East in conformity with its security requirements. 
In this study, the rapprochement between Turkey and Israel in the post-Cold 
war era, which reached its apex in 1996 with a military cooperation agreement, will 
be analyzed from the perspective of alliance politics. The major questions, which I 
will explore the answer for in this study are, can the relations between Turkey and 
Israel   be depicted as an alliance in the post-Cold war multipolar world order?; how 
can the Turkish-Israeli alignment and its effect on Turkish-Iranian relations be 
explained in a multipolar environment? 
The significance of this study is twofold. In the first place, Turkish-Israeli-
Iranian relations are evaluated as test cases in explaining a dimension of regional 
dynamics. This brings another reality/dimension to the discourse on globalization. 
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Secondly, approaching to the issues from a multipolar direction signifies a peaceful 
approach. And such an approach may serve the needs of a region whose people 
suffered too much already. 
The topic of research is of interest due to increasing importance of the Middle 
East region and evolving Turkish foreign policy towards the region. The nature and 
content of the Turkish-Israeli relations has been perceived and hauled as an alliance 
by regional countries immediately after the military agreements in 1996 and 1997. It 
has been long debated whether Turkey took sides in the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict 
and polarized the region through destabilizing sensitive balances. This has extracted 
from the argument that security based relations have serious repercussions on foreign 
policies of a state. While the statesmen of both countries have avoided targeting any 
third country despite enhancing relations, the term alliance had been used by many 
scholars to portray the rapprochement decreasing Turkey’s “freedom of 
maneuverability” in the region.  
This study argues that Turkish-Israeli relations which reached a climax in the 
late 1990s can not be depicted as a traditional alliance and it did not target any 
regional state though Turkey had severe ideological and security dominated 
problems with many a Middle Eastern country, such as Iran, Iraq and Syria.  The 
term “alignment” is thought to be more suitable regarding the nature and effects of 
Turkish-Israeli rapprochement. Since classical alliances include the provision of 
casus foederis, this kind of a relationship does not conform to multipolar world 
order.  Turkey, throughout the Republican history, adopted a cautious and exclusive 
foreign policy toward the region which depends on the preservation of balances in 
the Middle East. Relations with Israel in the type of traditional alliance approach 
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would deprive Turkey of the maneuver realm, which is a must for Ankara to deal 
with its increasing security needs in the region.   
Another objective of this study is to show that Turkey maintains continuity in 
its relations with many regional countries which is not affected by regime changes 
and religious rhetoric. As a case study, Turkish-Iranian relations are discussed from a 
historical perspective.  
Apart from the international level analysis, the focus of this study is restricted 
to regional political analyses by using a model for small states and empirical 
evidence from regional developments. The applicability of traditional alliance theory 
is assessed for Turkey in the post-Cold war era. The neorealist analyses of 
international politics start from the assumption that the international system is an 
anarchical self-help system in which states must be primarily concerned with their 
security, if they want to survive and protect their sovereignty. In accordance with this 
theoretical tendency it is argued that Turkey should preserve its freedom of 
maneuverability in the region by avoiding polarization. To emphasize the argument 
that Turkey and Israel do not have an alliance type relationship, controversial issues 
between the two countries such as their approach to the Kurdish issue, definition of 
terrorism and water debacle is put forward. 
The study comprises four chapters. Chapter 1 provides a background for 
theoretical explanations pertaining to alliance theory. It commences with a brief 
evaluation of traditional alliance theories which are based on the neo-realist balance 
of power theory. The study assumes Turkey and Israel as regional powers who do not 
conform to classical alliance theories since traditional approaches suppose two types 
of actors, namely the patron and client. Different types of alliances, given the 
dichotomy of balancing and bandwagoning are discussed. Moreover, traditional 
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theories fell short of expectations in explaining the Turkish-Israeli alignment due to 
their polarized, uncooperative but competitive spirit. In general, the deficiencies and 
inadequacies of the classical alliance theories regarding regional cooperative 
structures have been put forward throughout the chapter.  
The nature and development of Turkish-Israeli relations are the focus of the 
second chapter. The chapter begins with a theoretical explanation of contemporary 
multipolar world order. Basic premises of multipolarity have been discussed and it is 
argued that Turkey should enhance its realm of maneuver to better tackle with its 
security topics. Turkish-Israeli relations have been analyzed in accordance with this 
theoretical approach. The motivations of both countries and the controversial issues 
have made it clear that let alone establishing an alliance, the two countries may be in 
conflict in the future near due to their approach to the region and their ambitions. 
Turkish-Israeli relations have never been ruptured since the declaration of the state of 
Israel. Fluctuating relations, however, reached its climax in the late 1990s for various 
reasons. The growing strength of the PKK terrorist organization, severing bilateral 
relations with Syria made Turkey close to Israel to a considerable degree, but not 
sufficient to  break its mutual relations with other regional states. 
In the third chapter the repercussions of Turkish-Israeli alignment on 
Turkish-Iranian relations are evaluated. It is argued that Turkey has a special 
relationship with its eastern neighbor independent of regime changes and ideological 
discrepancies. Thus, Turkish-Israeli relations are not deemed to be a powerful 
determinant in Turkish-Iranian relations. Turkey has historically rooted relations 
with Iran beginning from the 15th century. The general direction of relations is that 
neither of the two states even desired the other to accumulate more power than itself. 
This approach characterizes the bilateral relations as relations of restrictions. On the 
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other hand, the mutual relations of Israel and Iran are full of rhetoric rather than 
tangible evidence of threat for each others’ existence. The Israeli and Iranian 
policymakers benefit from the Turkish-Israeli alignment for domestic consumption. 
Moreover, the limited conventional armed capabilities of Iran make it vulnerable 
against Turkey and Israel respectively in the aftermath of an improbable Iranian 
nuclear attack on these two states. Thus the issue of WMD (Weapons of Mass 
Destruction) is also an instrument of domestic politics both in Israel and Iran. This 
scheme lessens the importance of the claim that Iran is targeted by the Turkish-Israeli 
alignment.  
Consequently, Turkey-Israeli relations are far from being depicted as an 
alliance. Though they benefited from the cooperative relations to some degree the 
structural constraints in the politics of both countries depending upon geography, 
society and history limit the nature of Turkish-Israeli relations, but provide a 
breathing space for both, nonetheless.  
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CHAPTER I: 
THE ORIGINS OF ALLIANCES 
1.1. A Framework for Analysis 
The question of origins of alliances is one of the most central phenomena in 
the theory of International Relations (IR). Numerous studies have come together 
under the label of alliances all of which tried to explain the questions of how states 
choose their friends and what are the forces that bring states together and drive them 
apart?1 
There is an extensive literature on alliance theory, which mainly falls within 
the compass of balance of power theory and is dominated by the realist and 
neorealist schools of thought, though other approaches appear as well, not 
surprisingly from the realpolitik perspective. According to these traditions, anarchy 
in the international system leads states’ agendas to be dictated by security topics. As 
has been iterated in the studies on neo-realist alliance theory “national security” and 
“survival” have always been the chief underpinnings in states’ agenda while deciding 
to form an alliance or join a collective security organization though there are 
different structures by definition and function. The European alliances beginning 
from the 17th century, Central Powers and Entente, Axis and Allies in the two World 
Wars, classical environment of polarization during the Cold war and Middle Eastern 
alliances, to a lesser degree, are generally chosen as models by scholars to prove 
their hypotheses developed on theories of alliances where by a serious criticism is 
impinged upon them due to their limitations. 
In the Cold War era patron-client relations shaped the general explanations 
and characteristics of alliance theory specifically. Neo-realist Kenneth Waltz 
                                                 
1 Stephen Walt. The Origins of Alliances. (New York: Cornell University Press, 1987), p.1 
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declared, with his systemic approach, “In a bipolar world there are no peripheries. 
With only two powers capable of acting on a world scale, anything that happens 
anywhere is potentially of concern to both of them”.2 As for superpowers, efforts to 
restrict the sphere of influence of the other and to consolidate the unity in its own 
polar via foreign aid, political penetration or intimidation are perceived as the key 
instigators to form alliances or means to make their allies dependent. According to 
the traditional literature, all in all, the primary purpose of most alliances is to 
combine the member’s capabilities in a way that furthers their respective interests3 
which is usually called the “aggregation of power”4 model, the most prominent 
explanation of the origins of alliances.  
This chapter will mainly focus on the Third World aspect of alliance theories 
that is neglected throughout the Cold War era and mostly evaluated within the 
parameters of patron-client relationship in the literature. In most of the Third World 
countries, response to an external threat against national security or the struggle for 
consolidation of dictators’ respective regimes against domestic threats are configured 
as major factors in determining alliance politics of  the Third World countries. 
Traditional alliance theories assume these two types of states as the main actors (unit 
of analyses) in system level explanations (poles) neglecting the impact of the security 
dominated relations between regional powers5 who are worthy of attention. Relations 
between Turkey and Israel, and between Turkey and Iran which will be touched upon 
                                                 
2 Kenneth Waltz. Theory of International Politics. (Reading MA:Adisson-Wesley,1979), p.171 cited 
in Neumann, Stephanie G. “International Relations Theory and the Third World: An Oxymoron?”  
cited in International Relations and the Third World, Stephanie Neumann eds. ( New York: 
St.Martin’s Press,1998), p.11 
3 Stephen Walt. “Why Alliances Endure or Collapse” Survival Vol. 39, No. 1(Spring 1997), p.157. 
4 Stephen Walt. The Origins of Alliances. (New York: Cornell University Press, 1987), p.22 
5 Ersel Aydınlı. “Strong State, Fragmented Society Approach” (Unpublished Paper, Bilkent 
University,Dept of IR, December 2002). Asst. Prof. Ersel Aydınlı calls these states  “the modernizing 
world (democratizing world) which refers to those states of developing world that have long-standing 
strong state traditions, that have a history of aspiring to modernize, and that are highly concerned with 
traditional security dilemmas.  He iterates China, Russia, Turkey, Pakistan, India, as the examples.  
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later, can be categorized as relations between regional powers, not actually the Third 
World. But, initially, we have to assume that there is a huge gap between the 
traditional literature and regional power politics and very few studies have been 
conducted in this realm. Thus, we have to pace a long way to claim consistent 
hypotheses and finally theories pertaining to regional powers per se.  
The alignment between two regional (Turkey and Israel) states is to be 
studied as a case study for this thesis. The form of the cooperation between these two 
states, whether it is an alliance or an alignment, and the type of the states, both of 
which are not in conformity with the Cold War categorization (patron-client) states, 
needs to be reevaluated.  
 The type of the state is a crucial dimension of alliance studies in traditional 
IR literature. As argued above IR scholars have categorized the states in two classes 
during the Cold War years and paid little attention to Regional Powers since they 
focused on the US-Soviet confrontation.  At first scholars studied the superpowers 
also known as the “core” or the “patron” which were labeled as the locomotives of 
the world political system.6 They set the rules for others to obey during the Cold War 
as polar leaders. In this categorization, state and society became the main variables 
when defining the position of the state.  
On the other hand, the Third World or “client” has been characterized as 
poorly developed political entities, institutions and apartheid societies.7 In this 
category the state is so premature and weak that it has no power to impinge upon the 
society for internal peace and order, which gives birth to a legitimacy problem. Due 
to lack of power, the state or the “elite” in the administration is open to political 
manipulation by foreign powers and needs foreign support to consolidate its regime. 
                                                 
6 Ersel Aydınlı. “Strong State, Fragmented Society Approach” (Unpublished Paper, Bilkent 
University,Dept of IR, December 2002), p.5 
7 Ibid, p.6 
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The state has to resort to external aid to maintain its sovereignty and territorial 
integrity against an external threat due its inefficiency to mobilize its domestic 
sources because of lack of financial means, educated and experienced manpower or 
time restrictions. As a third world realist scholar Steven David, arguing largely from 
the Egyptian case in the 1960s that leaders of unstable and poorly institutionalized 
regimes seek out allies, particularly at the Great Power level, to combat their 
domestic enemies, and cannot respond to foreign threats.8 Barry Buzan points out 
these kinds of states are located particularly in Africa and Central Asia e.g. 
Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Somalia, Nigeria, Sudan and Zaire. 9 
At this point Mohammed Ayoob, as a realist, criticizes major IR theories for 
their inadequacies in explaining Third World countries’ politics. According to 
Ayoob, “the fundamental premise of structural realism that the anarchical nature of 
the system determines the behavior of the units (or states), is based upon a clear and 
rigid distinction between anarchy outside (at systemic level) and order within it (at 
unit level).”10 As for the neorealist school, he detects a minor difference of emphasis 
as to whether states balance against power or against threat. For him, neoliberalism 
also offers system-based explanations for the behavior of states. 11 As stated by 
Steven David, another realist, foreign policy making in Third World, especially why 
                                                 
8 Steven David. “Explaining the Thirld World Alignment”. World Politics. Vol. 43 (January 1991), 
p.235 
9 Barry Buzan, “Conclusions: System versus Units in Theorizing About the Third World,” in 
Stephanie Neumann eds. International Relations Theory and the Third World, (New York:St.Martin’s 
Press,1998) cited in Ersel Aydınlı. “Strong State, Fragmented Society Approach” (Unpublished Paper, 
Bilkent University,Dept of IR, December 2002), p.5  
10Muhammed Ayoob. “Subaltern Realism:International Relations Theory Meets the Third World” in 
International Relations and the Third World, Stephanie Neumann eds. (New York: St.Martin’s 
Press,1998), p.34 
11 Ibid, p.35 
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Third World states ally as they do, is not well understood and it is central to 
understanding the course of international politics.12 
  This study does not claim to fill this gap but tries to identify a specific gap 
in classical alliance theories and their perceived deficiencies related to the Third 
World in general. Given the post-Cold War environment, which is characterized by 
intra-state conflicts based on ethnicity, religion or separatist fractions with territorial 
ambitions, it can be easily argued that the bilateral relations of the regional powers 
such as Turkey and Israel will have a great impact in a multipolar (post-Cold War) 
systemic structure and deserves a respective position in IR theory.  
1.2. Alliances and Alignments: The Definitional Distinction 
 Another important point in the literature is the distinction between 
definitions of alliance and alignment and it is useful to stipulate their somewhat 
different meanings while in many studies they are used interchangeably. A complex 
bilateralism is evident in the evolving international system and the character of state 
relations tend to be more cooperative in an economically and politically globalizing 
environment. Consequently, fluid alignments are replacing rigid alliances.13  
According to Glenn Snyder, alignment is a broader and more fundamental 
term related to expectations in state-to-state relations in future interactions.14 Any 
interaction between states, no matter how minor, may create expectations and 
feelings of alignment.  The label “alignment” is a confirmation to cooperate based 
simply on shared interests rather than on a negotiated reduction of conflict.  
                                                 
12 Steven David. “Explaining the Thirld World Alignment”. World Politics. Vol. 43 (January 1991), 
p.233 
13Edward A. Kolodziej. “Implications of security Patterns Among Developing States” 10 April, 2001. 
Available at http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1982/sep-oct/kolodziej.html. 
Accesed on 29,12,2003 
14 Glenn H. Snyder. Alliance Politics.( New York: Cornell University Press, 1997), p.6 
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On the other hand, alliances are simply one of the behavioral means to create 
or reinforce alignments. Alliances generally strengthen preexisting alignments by 
introducing elements of precision, legal and moral obligation, and reciprocity. 
Formal alliances introduce a sense of obligation not present in tacit alignments15 that 
can be thought in the context of normal bilateral state relationships. According to 
George Liska, “Alliances are against, and only derivatively for, someone or 
something”.16 He continues that alliances are formal associations of states for the use 
of military force, in special circumstances, against states outside their own 
membership. Alliances also vary in scope of commitments that is casus foederis, in 
their anticipated duration and may be limited geographically (e.g. NATO to the 
North Atlantic area).  
The definition differentiates alliances from tacit alignments, based only on 
common interests and goals. The “other” or the “third party” orientation points to the 
main differences between an alliance and an alignment. We distinguish formal 
alliances from alignments by the greater length of commitment present in the 
alliance, while alignments reflect similarity in interests without the formal mutual 
commitment present in an alliance.17  
Alliances are more prone to occur in anarchic environments against external 
threats or a common enemy in the form of pooling military strength, which create the 
“security dilemma” given irreducible uncertainty about the intentions of others and 
reverse effect intrinsically. Alliances somewhat reflect contingencies such that they 
are valid as long as the interests of allies converge.  The most obvious example can 
                                                 
15 Ibid, p.8 
16 George Liska. Nations in Alliances: The Limits of Interdependence (Baltimore:Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1962),p.3 in Snyder, Glenn H. Alliance Politics. (New York: Cornell University 
Press, 1997), p.2 
17 James D. Morrow. “Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model 
of Alliances.”American Journal of Political Science,Vol. 35, No. 4 (November 1991), p..906 
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be seen in the divergence of Soviet and American interests at the end of WWII, 
which resulted in the Cold War.  
 In this study, the term “alignment” is used, meaning non-binding cooperative 
agreements in bilateral relations, supporting mutual interactions in conformity with 
Glenn Snyder’s views, whereas the term “alliance”, meaning binding security 
guarantees which includes the casus foederis18 provision. 
Since this study does not claim to come up with a generalized system of 
relations between regional powers (whether alliances or alignment is more 
widespread between them or what the nature of the relationship is since these type of 
regional powers were not mentioned adequately in traditional literature), the different 
aspects of up-to-date alliance theories and their relevant dimensions will be 
discussed. The aim is to raise the following questions in the light of the empirical 
case study presented here. Namely, what is the ability and discrepancies of classical 
alliance theories to explain the relations between regional powers in the post-Cold 
War environment? And how can the Turkish-Israeli alignment and its effect on 
Turkish-Iranian relations are explained in post-Cold War environment? 
1.3. Explaining Alliance Formation 
Generally speaking, nations create alliances fundamentally as a response to 
perceived threat to national security since “survival” is the main goal of all states. As 
a general principle states form or join alliances if the benefits of doing so are greater 
than the costs. In traditional realism and neo-realism, alliance theory argues that 
                                                 
18 A stipulation about who will support whom in what contingencies and a secret agenda against third 
states asking for the help of an ally in the event of an aggression (including military attacks). 
According to Stephen Walt (The Origins of Alliances, p.167) an alliance may be either offensive or 
defensive, for example, intended either to provide the means for an attack on some third party or 
intended as a mutual guarantee in the event that another state attacks one of the alliance members. An 
alliance may also be symmetrical or asymmetrical, depending on the whether the members possess 
roughly equal capabilities. Another category is the level of institutionalization in alliances. (An 
extreme example is NATO). 
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changing power configurations are responses to changing alliances. The main 
difference between the two approaches is that realism offers a unit level (state-level) 
analysis and assumes the international system as anarchic emphasizing power 
maximization, whereas the neorealist approach provides us with a systemic analyses 
(international-level) and suppose that there is a hierarchy between states in 
conformity with the distribution of capabilities among them emphasizing security 
maximization. States deal with perceived external threat by adding their respective 
power19 and naturally balance the distribution of relative capabilities. 
1.3.1. Theories on Balancing 
The Realist and Neorealist Schools of thought dominate alliance theories. 
According to this tradition, the systemic structure, structural polarity and anarchy 
determine the formation of alliances. In particular, anarchic characteristics of the 
international system lead states to accord primacy to their national security. States, 
when unable to face a stronger enemy, generally decide to cooperate and mass their 
capabilities in order to balance the common enemy, which is usually called the 
“aggregation of power” model. According to neo-realist Steven David, the 
determinants of alliance come overwhelmingly from the structure of the international 
system, particularly the actual and potential external threats that states face.20  
The results of reconfiguration of capabilities’ distribution between states to 
form an equal distribution of power against these potential external threats are 
alliances. According to realist Hans Morgenthau alliance is “a necessary function of 
                                                 
19 Stephanie G. Neumann. “International Relations Theory and the Third World: An Oxymoron?”  in 
International Relations and the Third World, Stephanie Neumann eds. (New York: St.Martin’s 
Press,1998), p.2 
20Steven David. “Explaining the Third World Alignment”. World Politics  Vol. 43 (January 1991), 
p.234 
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the balance of power operating in a multi-state system”.21 Whether formal or 
informal, the key to determining whether an alliance has been contracted is the 
willingness of at least one of the parties to pay a cost in some tangible way to support 
the other.22 
The classical “balance of power” theory is the most prominent and common 
theory when explaining the alliance behaviors of states. Kenneth Waltz constructs 
balance of power theory as a central element of neo-realism in his book Theory of 
International Politics. In anarchy, he states, sovereign entities are concerned with 
security and survival; they are unitary actors that perform similar functions. Because 
state’s main concern is security and survival, they are very sensitive if a relative 
capability of another state increases. The outcome is the formation of balances of 
power. In other words weaker states will form alliances to oppose stronger powers.23 
Alliances, according to this perspective, are the means by which states maintain 
among themselves an approximately equal distribution of power. According to 
“balance of power” theory, population, technological prowess, economic, industrial 
and military resources constitute the power. For this balancing, respective military 
power, security interests and external threats, rather than domestic factors determine 
states’ alliance behavior. When exposed to an external threat, a state may either 
aggregate its power to one of the other states to balance the enemy’s power or try to 
                                                 
21 Hans Morgenthau. Politics among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace, p.201 cited in 
Piccoli, Wolfango. Alliance Theory: The Case of Turkey and Israel. (Unpublished  MA Thesis) 
Bilkent University, (June 1999),  p.18 
22 Gregory Gause.  “Discussion Paper: Alliances in the Middle East.” Middle East Studies Association 
Convention.Chicago,Illıonis, (December 4-6,1998)Available at 
http://www.uvm.edu/~fgause/alliances.htm Giris tarihi, 29.12.2003,p. 4 
23 Stephen Walt. “Testing Theories of Alliance Formulation: The Case of Southwest Asia.” 
International Organization.Vol.42, No.42. (Spring 1988), p. 276 
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increase its own power by mobilizing its domestic sources where the former leads to 
an alliance and the latter to armament race.24  
Another analysis of the formation of alliances came from Stephen Walt, in 
which the concept of “threat” is central to his neo-realist orientation of “balance of 
threat” hypotheses. As a main argument, Walt addresses, in contrast to traditional 
balance of power theorists that states ally to balance against threats rather than 
against power alone. 25 He criticizes the classical structural balance of power theory 
for its overemphasis on the concept of power. For him, although the distribution 
power is an exceptionally important feature, the level of threat is also affected by 
geographic proximity, offensive capabilities and perceived intentions.  
The role of ideology as a cause of alliance is assessed difficult to measure by 
Walt. According to him ideological consistency has been readily abandoned when 
threats to other interests emerged.26  In short, ideological preferences have been less 
important than more immediate issues of security. He argues that many forms of 
apparently ideological alliances are in fact a form of balancing behavior.27 
Geographic proximity meant that states that are nearby pose a greater threat 
than those that are far away. In conformity with Walt, Snyder argues that 
geographical features, by their effect on defensive or offensive capabilities, may also 
induce alignments.28 While many scholars question the effect of geography with the 
technological developments of weapons (long-range missiles, hi-tech aviations) and 
changing type of threat from conventional to unconventional or unformatted (e.g. 
terrorism), geography is a crucial dimension of forming alliances especially for 
                                                 
24 Hans Morgenthau. Politics among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace.p.201 cited in 
Piccoli, Wolfango. Alliance Theory: The Case of Turkey and Israel. (Unpublished MA Thesis) 
Bilkent University, (June 1999), p.18 
25 Stephen Walt. The Origins of Alliances ( New York: Cornell University Press, 1987), p.5 
26 Ibid, p.183 
27 Ibid, p.6 
28 Glenn H. Snyder “Alliances, balance, stability” International Organization. Vol. 45, No.1, (Winter 
1991), p.124 
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regional powers since a multipolar environment and intense regional conflicts make 
cooperative structures an essential element of the foreign policies of all regional 
states. States can choose their friends but not their neighbors. The geographic 
proximity of the danger or perceived threat, which can be depicted as coming from 
Iran, Syria and separatist groups in northern Iraq, made Turkey seek friends to 
counter the threat, which resulted in new cooperative realms. 
Walt also argues that states that are viewed as aggressive are likely to 
provoke others to balance against them. Perceptions of intent are likely to play an 
important role in alliance choices.29 Perceived intention is a long term phenomenon 
derived from the political, and military, economic implementations of the threatening 
state. The form of the regime (democratic, theocratic, autocratic, or communist) can 
also be thought as a variable in shaping that perception since democratic regimes are 
less likely to wage war, but impose democratic peace on each other.  
The debate about alliance formation is also focused on the issue of how states 
choose sides in a conflict, in short on the dichotomy between balancing and 
bandwagoning. Neo-realist Kenneth Waltz uses “bandwagoning” to serve as the 
opposite of balancing: bandwagoning refers to joining the stronger coalition, 
balancing means allying with the weaker side.30  
The balancing/bandwagoning dichotomy was further developed by Walt. 
While there are similarities between descriptions, Walt redefines bandwagoning as 
“alignment with the source of danger”.31 According to him, balancing is more 
preferable since no statesman can be sure about the act of others. For him, 
bandwagoning increases the resources available to the threatening state and leaves 
                                                 
29 Stephen Walt. The Origins of Alliances. (New York: Cornell University Press, 1987), p.25 
30 Kenneth Waltz. Theory of International Politics. (Reading MA:Adisson-Wesley,1979), p.126 
31 Stephen Walt. The Origins of Alliances. (New York: Cornell University Press, 1987), p.17 
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the weaker side at the mercy of the stronger.32 Moreover, in the conclusion of his 
analysis on alliance policies of Turkey, Walt argues that during the Cold War Turkey 
adopted a balancing strategy against the Soviets and explains the increasing ties 
between Turkey and Soviet Union in the late 1970s as a result of Turkish 
administration’s belief that the Soviet Union was no longer a threat.33  
As a neo-realist, Randall Schweller is one of the scholars who bases alliance 
analyses on the distinction between status-quo powers and revisionist states by 
arguing that “generally, revisionist powers are the prime movers of alliance behavior 
whereas the status-quo states are the reactors”34 with his hypotheses of balance of 
interests. According to him bandwagoning is an alliance not with threat but with the 
stronger one and argues that “the most important determinant of alliance is the 
compatibility of political goals, not the imbalances power or threat”35 since the 
members of alliance sacrifice some of their foreign policy autonomy. The 
opportunities for gain and profit, as well as threat, are major motivations to ally 
besides political compatibility.  
Evaluating the alliance formulations from status-quo and revisionist 
perspective, Schweller distinguishes between four type of states in unit level 
analysis;1)The “Lions”, satisfied with the status-quo and ready to protect it; 2) the 
“Wolves”, ready to pay every price to change the status-quo;3) the “Jackals” 
unsatisfied free-riders ready to trail “Wolves” or “Lions” who is perceived to be 
victorious; 4) the “Lambs” willing to pay low costs for their defense and suspected of 
                                                 
32 Ibid, p. 29 
33 Stephen Walt. “Testing Theories of Alliance Formulation: The Case of Southwest Asia.” 
International Organization Vol.42, No.42  (Spring 1988), p.298 
34 Randall Schweller. “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist state Back In”, 
International Security Vol.19, No.1 (1994), p.105 
35 Ibid, p.88 
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bandwagoning.36 Considering the mentioned aim of these states a differentiation 
cannot be detected from the classic patron-client relationship since Lions or Wolves 
are depicted in the role of patron.  Even in the event of a status-quo transformation, 
Lions and Wolves solely change their respective position since Wolves desire to 
pursue the luxury of binding with a strong state and become a Lion. 
But Schweller made this categorization to relax the dichotomy between 
balancing and bandwagoning, as did Walt. This dichotomy does not encompass the 
full range of choices within the realm of alliance. This stems from a rigid point of 
view in the Cold war style policy making of “you are the enemy of my enemy and 
ally of my ally”. At the systemic level he argues that the distribution of capabilities is 
not the only determinant of hierarchy. Objectives of the states and their abilities to 
use their power, namely the fungibility of power, are also important in the system, in 
conformity with neo-realist systemic approach.37 
 With the end of the Cold war many formerly important Third World clients 
lost their strategic significance. This means that states have to adopt a policy to 
pursue their own objectives independent from the balancing/bandwagoning 
dichotomy. According to neo-realist Alvin Rubinstein “we are leaving the age of 
alliances”.38 The lack of interest in alliances by rising powers suggests confidence in 
the inherent stability of the international system. Given the costs of a serious conflict 
for even a short time, the benefits of aggressive states are limited or uncertain. In his 
conclusion, Rubinstein focuses on the deterrence capacity of a reliable nuclear 
                                                 
36 Ibid, p.100 
37 Ibid, p.105. 
38Alvin Z. Rubinstein, “Alliances and Strategy: Rethinking Security” World Affairs Vol.3,No.2  
(April-June ,1999), p. 10 
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power, which he believes, rendered alliances much less essential if not obsolete for 
security in traditional terms.39  
In reality there are many ways to accommodate a threatening state besides 
allying with or against it: the choices available are not strictly restricted to the ones 
implied in the alternative “with the stronger, or against the stronger”. Paul Schroeder 
suggests the alternatives as: declaring neutrality; approaching other states on one or 
both sides to improve relations, but short of alliance.40 Thus, regional states may find 
a way to improve their relations with neighbors or precipitate the already-formed 
relations in the absence of the Cold War and adopt different methods from that of 
alliance limitations while tackling with their security needs. 
All in all, in the post-Cold war environment, while “threat” itself still has an 
explanatory capacity on alliance behaviors, the balancing/bandwagoning dichotomy 
is questionable since the states have other options. But we have to assume that all 
Cold War-originated theoretical explanations and arguments underplay the role of 
regional powers, by focusing on the patron and client relationship or classification. 
Similarly, Jack Levy and Michael Barnett maintain that realism is “relatively silent in 
concerning Third World alliances in general or how state-society relations in 
particular might give rise to distinctive patterns of alliance behavior”.41  Another 
comment came from K. J. Holsti who stated that in European history competitive 
arms race was the result of security dilemma between states whereas those in the 
Third World were motivated by fear of regimes to protect themselves, their desire to 
                                                 
39 Ibid. 
40 Paul Schroeder. “Alliances, 1815-1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management” in Klauss 
Knorr eds. Historical dimensions of National Security.(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1976), 
p.117 
41 Levy and Barnett.  “Alliance Formation” cited in Randall Schweller. “Bandwagoning for Profit: 
Bringing the Revisionist state Back In”, International Security Vol.19,No.1(1994), p.77 
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prop up governments and to pressure various segments of the population.42  Thinking 
that “ethnicity”, which is discovered as the source of trouble in peripheries, does not 
have the explanatory capacity, he proposes three different levels of analysis: first, 
individual psychology; second, inter-group dynamics; and third, systemic 
characteristics.43 
To be able to grasp the subject better and to analyze the mentioned gap that 
pertains to regional powers, a short review of Third World alliance theories will be 
provided.  
1.3.2. Theories of Alliances in the Third World 
Seeing the inter-connectedness between realist, neorealist theories and their 
explanatory capacity for the Third World, some scholars tried to fill this gap, arguing 
that the Third World is an integral part of the international system. Mohammed 
Ayoob believes that in many states in the Third World, elements of anarchy clearly 
co-exist with those of order within the boundaries of state and stresses that it is 
problematic to agree with the assumption about the sameness of states on which 
much of neorealist and neoliberal analyses are based44 referring to developed states 
of Western Europe and America. For him neorealist and neoliberal theories neglect 
the domestic variables affecting conflict and order in the Third World. 
 Keeping in mind these considerations Ayoob suggests an alternative to the 
currently dominant paradigms in IR that is Subaltern Realism.45 He assumes that the 
issues of domestic order are intertwined with those of international order including 
                                                 
42 K.J. Holsti.  “International Relations Theory and Domestic War in Third World: The Limits of 
Relevance” in International Relations and the Third World, Stephanie Neumann eds. (New York: 
St.Martin’s Press,1998), p.107 
43 Ibid,p.110 
44 Muhammed Ayoob. “Subaltern Realism:International Relations Theory Meets the Thirld World” in 
International Relations and the Third World, Stephanie Neumann eds. (New York: St.Martin’s 
Press,1998),  p.37 
45 Ibid, p.34 
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the variable of the stage of state making and evaluates the issues of domestic order as 
a part of state making. State making is a process of forming democratic institutions 
and administrative organs in a state, which is fully democratic and legitimate. The 
stage of state making is related to the level of political capacity of a state; it is in its 
initial stages in underdeveloped states and the highest rank in Western style 
developed states but mostly used as a variable to explain internal conflicts by Ayoob.  
Another interesting and related point of Ayoob’s suggestions for this study is 
that the existence of territorial and demographic problems between the states which 
are on the path of state-making should be examined.46 While Ayoob does not make a 
distinction that is pertinent to the level of state making47 between neighboring states 
and its effect on their policy-making, Turkey had some problems with its neighbors 
due to their intentions to hinder Turkey from becoming a regional power utilizing its 
demographic and economic dynamics. Seeing Turkey’s becoming a developing state 
as a challenge, some of Turkey’s neighbors’ were intent to use its demographic 
structure and territory by supporting separatist fractions with territorial ambitions, 
which are corroborated by Ayoob’s assumptions to a certain degree.  
Relations between states are increasingly framed by available military power 
and many developing states are capable of producing their own weapons, either 
indigenously or under license.  The most prominent factor prompting this tendency is 
their desire to be independent of foreign suppliers. According to Edward Kolodziej 
“the diffusion of economic and military resources and accompanying political 
influence to the advantage of selected but critically important developing states has 
fostered a more decentralized regional and international system. More developing 
                                                 
46 Ibid, p.46 
47 Turkey is far more experienced than its neighbors considering the state-making procedure and as 
the most democratic Muslim country in the region.  
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states than ever before are significant actors on the international stage.”48 While 
Ayoob did not clearly put forward the impact of the stage of state-making on alliance 
behavior of states, it is clear that the higher the level of state-making, the more 
freedom the state has in its choices whether it is a classic (patron-client) alliance or 
other form of bilateral relations. 
Finally he emphasizes the effect of Great Powers that are capable of 
exacerbating or alleviating regional conflicts in the Third World and their policies 
toward particular regions.49 Given the dominance of the US and its military existence 
in the Middle East region, it is highly possible for regional states, including Turkey, 
to be affected in their policy-making and implementing regional US policies either 
internally or externally.  
The intrinsic domestic weakness of the elite in the Third World countries and 
their alliance decisions are the object of the studies carried out by realist Steven 
David. He offers omnibalancing as an alternate concept, holding that alliance in the 
Third World often reflects the government’s attempt to balance against internal threat 
rather than external enemies.50 Omnibalancing is argued to emerge from observations 
from the Third World and incorporates the need of leaders to appease secondary 
adversaries, as well as to balance against both internal and external threats in order to 
survive.51  
The crux of omnibalancing is that leaders will align to tackle with those 
threats that endanger their survival, internal or external. For him, it is more likely and 
more potent the internal threat that alliance theories ignore. He asserts that “realism 
                                                 
48 Edward A. Kolodziej. “Implications of security Patterns Among Developing States” 10 April, 2001. 
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must be broadened to examine internal threats in addition to focusing on external 
threats and capabilities (that is structural argument), and that the leader of the state 
rather than the state itself should be used as the level of analysis”.52 Rational 
calculation of the Third World leader is assumed to be the most powerful 
determinant of Third World alignment.  
He also argues that there are fundamental similarities between Third World 
states. With internal threat (with or without external support) and arbitrariness of 
their borders, many Third World states began and remain more as an artificial 
construct than a coherent unit.53 In his analytical work he refers to Egypt and 
Ethiopia in the 1970s, two underdeveloped countries in the Cold War environment. 
These countries can be categorized in the first class of underdeveloped dictatorships 
and legitimacy of the regime in the eyes of the community is so low that the elite 
(either civilian or military) in the administration perceive a constant internal threat. 
This is not an issue in regional power since their ability to legitimize power in order 
to attain legitimacy with its own domestic resources independent of external aid, 
enables developing states to move more freely in their policy options. Thus the 
argument related to the explanatory capacity of omnibalancing theory by David 
seems to have little applicability in the states which are not autocracies under 
dictatorship or under the rule of a leader’s hegemony since he is referring to the 
orientation of narrow authoritarian elite. In the post-Cold War environment, we need 
a more comprehensive and inclusive theory examining the regional powers and their 
alliance behaviors. 
An additional explanation dedicated to state-society relations in shaping the 
state’ security policies is provided by Micheal Barnett and Jack Levy. They 
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examined Egypt’s foreign policy between 1962 and 1973. More specifically, these 
two scholars analyze domestic events in order to highlight the incentives to conclude 
external alliances. For them, a state facing an external threat may not be able to 
mobilize its domestic resources in order to cope with the danger, as a result of 
economic weakness or some other reasons. If the internal threats to government are 
more salient than the external ones, a policy of external alliance may be preferred 
over the option of internal mobilization in order to maintain the regime.54   They also 
mention the difficulties of directing the weak countries’ domestic sources to 
armament efforts, bypassing the basic needs of society which undermines the ruling 
elites’ narrow base of political support.  
The type of the state mentioned by Barnett and Levy is the same as iterated 
by Steven David, underdeveloped dictatorship or autocracy, which has a very limited 
legitimacy over the society. But in a given case all states do not have to choose either 
external alliance or mobilization of domestic sources. Some regional powers that 
Barnett and Levy neglect have also significant military and economic capacity to 
deal with external and internal threats.  
There are other authors who base alliance behavior of the state on the 
combination of internal costs and external benefits. According to neo-realist James 
D. Morrow, one partner in an alliance receives autonomy whereas the other receives 
security at the expense of some of its dependence that he calls asymmetric alliance.55 
He argues that weak states lost some of their autonomy as a quit pro quo for security 
when allied with a powerful state. For him, these kind of asymmetrical alliances last 
longer than symmetrical alliances, which are formed by more or less equal powers, 
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since there is competitiveness and drive to control between members of symmetrical 
alliances. 56  
Consequently, the post-Cold war environment can be depicted as a multipolar 
scheme, which witnesses the increase of regional powers pursuing their own 
interests. Many states found themselves in richness of alternatives pertaining to their 
foreign policy in conformity with their geographic location, demography and the 
level of development. The balancing/bandwagoning dichotomy falls short of 
expectations to account for all state policies that the end of the Cold War makes 
available. 
 In this chapter, the theoretical background was provided by examining the 
dominant alliance theories in IR literature. The lack of a comprehensive theory of 
states’ bilateral relations in the post-Cold War environment is severely felt as this 
chapter tried to put forward. We are leaving the age of alliances. What will be the 
states’ reactions in given circumstances and which type of relations will they lead as 
Paul Schroeder iterated?  
While these questions still await answers, it is obvious that states will pursue 
their interests and try to avoid being dependent and not to be manipulated by external 
forces. After all, the theoretical explanations related to alliance formation, examined 
above, fell short of the expectations given their explanatory capacity for regional co-
operations which are independent of superpower effect to a certain degree. In this 
context, intensifying Turkish-Israeli relations figure out a new post-Cold war 
regional cooperation due to their respective motivations but can not be labeled as an 
alliance, but are rather an alignment. 
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CHAPTER II: 
THE TURKISH-ISRAELI ALIGNMENT 
  
Witnessing the shortcomings of Cold-war originated theories in explaining 
Turkish-Israeli relations which came up in an unprecedented epoch  (during a 
transformation of the world order from a bipolar to a multipolar order when values 
were being re-evaluated), multipolarity comes to the surface as the most suitable 
model with its  capacity to explain the subject. This chapter begins with laying down 
the main assumptions of a multipolar environment and characteristics of state 
behaviors. Then, it continues with explaining Turkish foreign policy of İsmet İnönü 
during the Second World War. Turkey was able to avoid joining WWII thanks to its 
“freedom of maneuverability” which was provided by agreements during war years 
and exploited the political environment by making non-aggression treaties with both 
sides for its national interests.  Focusing on the analogy of world conjuncture in the 
context of multi-centric structure, the resemblances between contemporary and the 
İnönü-era Turkish foreign policies will be discussed by using multipolarity as a 
model in terms of political maneuverability.  In the same context, how Turkey was 
able to broaden its maneuverability in its foreign policy by forming an alignment 
with Israel will be assessed. 
2.1. Multipolarity 
 Multipolarity is defined as a circumstance in which roughly equivalent 
capabilities are possessed by three or more great powers in the world.57 These nearly 
equal great powers struggle to increase their relative influence and obtain “relative 
advantage” by either co-operating or increasing their power with domestic resources 
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vis-à-vis their potential adversaries. An alliance of two states could easily deter a 
third state, even if the mentioned state would become more powerful than either of 
them.58  
Multipolar systems differ in the number of great and small powers in the 
system and their geographic positions. In general, poles are large and powerful states 
(or in some versions, alliances), separated by a big power gap from others.59 Polarity 
is a measure of the distribution of capabilities among great powers but not equivalent 
in number to great powers which is related to the size of the system. Parties in the 
system may interact with each other either directly or indirectly. As a basic 
assumption, the number of interactions among great powers increases as the number 
of roughly equal powers increase. 
Multipolarity makes the international system more complex, because 
movements in the system are relatively more fluid in the context of “freedom of 
maneuverability” and state diplomacy could be more flexible.60 According to Samuel 
P. Huntington, in a multipolar world of the 21st century, the major powers will 
inevitably compete, clash and coalesce with each other in various permutations and 
combinations.61 
Here comes the question of how to preserve stability in the system. Generally, 
in multipolar systems, strict competition through alliances and counter-alliances are 
replaced by the strategy of give-and-take. For Richard Aliano shifting alignments are   
the central mechanism for the preservation of equilibrium in a multipolar (balance of 
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power) system.62 This shifting balance encourages conciliation between states and 
affects the threat perceptions by assuming any country as a potential partner at first, 
not the enemy. According to Charles Kegley, as more states ascend to great power 
status, the number, range and diversity of mutually beneficial trade-offs among them 
rise, declining the prospect of armed conflict.63 Lacking rigid polarization, multipolar 
systems provide medium-level powers with more room for maneuver and 
opportunities to articulate themselves. (Shown in Figure 2.1) 
                                                         
 
Figure 2.1 Distributions of Capabilities in a Hypothetical Ten-Member State 
System.64 
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But there are critics as well. According to some neo-realist authors, it is highly 
difficult for great powers to assess their relative strength which results in the form of 
uncertainty within the system. For the same authors, multipolar systems are more 
war-prone for reasons mentioned which is a consequence of the system’s complexity 
and fluid alliance structure.65 
The difficulty in keeping coordination between actors to form an influential 
power constitutes another point of criticism. Members of alliances may be reluctant 
to bear the burden of providing shelter for other members. Moreover, to take support 
from a great power may not be probable unless the mentioned power perceives a real 
and imminent threat to its own security. Besides, when confronted with two possible 
enemies, a party might choose to keep silent, exploiting the situation and may not be 
able to foresee being subsequently the target of the victorious side. Accordingly, 
security alignments will become more flexible on the familiar realist assumption that 
today’s friend may be tomorrow’s enemy.66 
All in all, multipolar systems generally provide states with many opportunities 
and options but not a zero-sum game. Accordingly, the (relative) freedom of 
maneuverability in multipolar systems has been evaluated as the utmost important 
and analogical point in this study given the nature of pre- and post-Cold war 
environments. 
2.2. The Political Environment before WWII 
After WWI, changes in borders created a new distribution of capabilities 
(power) in Europe. The collapse of the monarchies in Europe led the victors to form 
a flexible proto-collective security structure to bring peace to Europe in the 
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beginning of the 20th century. They created the League of Nations under which states 
agreed to provide collective security by aligning against the potential aggressor. A 
formal but fluid structure was formed which sought to provide security without rigid 
alliances.67 But most great powers preferred to enhance their security by forming 
alliances rather than using the negotiating platform of collective security because 
they had not much faith in the mechanism.68  
Vengeful treaties of WWI that paid little attention to borders and economic 
conditions in Europe, arbitrary behavior of the victors in the League of Nations and 
their efforts to exploit the institution on behalf of their interests instigated the 
defeated towards revenge and paved the way of another world war.  
During this era, Turkey actively joined and supported peaceful efforts by 
playing a leading role in establishing the Saadabad Pact (Turkey, Iran, Iraq, 
Afghanistan) in 1934 and the Balkan Entente (Turkey, Greece, Romania, 
Yugoslavia) in 1937 to establish a belt of peace and prosperity surrounding the 
country69. Ankara avoided joining the European poles (either camp: Nazi Germany, 
Fascist Italy, Communist Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, USA) keeping in mind 
the memories of WWI and War of Liberation. This avoidance was put into practice 
by an experienced Turkish statesman, İsmet İnönü. 
2.2.1. Policies of İsmet İnönü during WWII 
İsmet İnönü was elected as the second President of the Republic following 
Atatürk's death in 1938. He was the President and chairman of the Republican 
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Peoples’ Party (RPP) at the same time.  Inönü's greatest success was in keeping 
Turkey out of the Second World War.70  
His policy in this regard was based on establishing various balances at the same 
time and insisting adamantly on active neutrality. Turkey had no outstanding issues 
to resolve through war. The object was to maintain its independence, sovereignty and 
unity. It tried to avoid adventures and pursued a logical policy under İsmet İnönü’s 
administration.71 To keep promises given to other nations, respect the inviolability of 
borders and territorial integrities of all states, abide by the rules of international law 
but to use force only if national interests were at stake were the main principles that 
shaped İnönü’s foreign policy  during WWII. Consolidating the Republican regime, 
in addition to the poor state of military power, which was still equipped with WWI 
accoutrement were added conditions as a domestic reasons to adopt this position 
went. 
When the Soviet-German Agreement was signed on 23 August 1939, İnönü 
thought that this agreement could harm Turkey and signed agreements with France 
and Britain on 13 October 1939 which did not stipulate Turkey to go to war with 
Soviet Union while it obtained economic aid from the former. In this agreement, 
Turkey added secret articles that restricted joining war under certain conditions. At 
no time was this alliance, which was geared to protect the Eastern Mediterranean 
from yet another Mediterranean aggressor- Italy-was to bring Turkey to hostility with 
the Soviet Union. 
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 Later İnönü signed a nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union on 25 March 
1941. By signing this agreement, İnönü preferred to develop mutual relations with 
both the Soviets and Franco-Britain Pact rather than aligning with one side. He stated 
that “our interest is to find allies in the West; we will behave according to this main 
idea”.72 In June 1941, a few days before Germany attacked the Soviet Union, İnönü 
signed a nonaggression pact with Germany to ensure Hitler of Turkey’s neutrality. 
Inönü was careful to establish multilateral relations with the powers engaged in the 
conflict. With the 1941 agreement, Turkey expanded its maneuverability and attained 
the freedom of forging economic ties with both Germany and Britain.73 
In accordance with this principle Turkey adopted active neutrality when 
Germans attacked the Soviet Union which caused the occupation of Iran by Britain 
from the south and by the Soviets from the north in order to supply Soviets with 
Allied assistance. This policy of balances continued throughout the war. Turkey 
remained formally neutral, but sought to enhance its regional influence by bargaining 
with both the Axis and Allies but without ant aspirations. That is why Turkey’s 
demands came into conflict with the interests or diplomatic tactics of the warring 
parties.74 
When the war was about to end, in conformity with Inönü’s multi-faceted 
foreign policy, Turkey sided with the USA, Britain and the Soviet Union and 
declared war against Germany and Japan, and signed the United Nations 
communiqué dated 24 January 1945. Turkey joined officially the San Francisco 
                                                 
72Ibid, p.565 
73Zekeriya Türkmen. “Türk Basının da Çıkan Haberlere Göre İkinci Dünye Savaşı Yıllarında Türkiye 
Cumhuriyeti’ni Savaşa Çekme Gayretleri” (The Efforts to Force Turkey into War on Turkish Press 
During WWII) in Altıncı Askeri Tarih Semineri Bildirileri, Vol.2  (Proceedings of the Sixth Military 
History Seminar), (Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1999), p.91 
74Robert M. Cutler. “(Russian) and Soviet Relations with Greece and Turkey: A systems Perspective” 
Available at  htpp://robertcutler.org/ch91dc.htm Accessed on Feb 01, 2004. 
 33 
Conference on 5 March 1945 in order to be a founding member of the United 
Nations.  
According to Turkish foreign policy makers during WWII, Turkey was a small 
power at the crossroads, thus had to maximize its capacity to maneuver in politics 
and had to oppose polarization in international relations. A small state could only 
survive with its own sources. For these kinds of states, while adopting a policy, 
concepts like “traditional friendship”, “strategic alliance”, “eternal enemy” and 
“relations in historical roots” did not have permanence.75 
We know from history that analogies can suggest lessons. Though the past can 
not provide us with perfect analogies, we need to look for types of behaviors that 
may guide us in an unprecedented international system.76 In the same context the 
absence of hostility with its neighbors (though Turkey perceive threat from many of 
them to some extent), a geography sharing borders and a peace-oriented policy-
making and foreign policy options in the post-Cold War era constitute some 
analogies in terms of “freedom of maneuverability” with  the political environment 
of the Inönü era. 
Today an ongoing debate is whether we live in multipolar or unipolar world. 
Many social scientists comment on the subject, taking into account various 
dimensions. They believe that after the demise of the Soviet Union, US leads world 
affairs as the only superpower. The European Union, the emergence of the Russian 
Federation as an important actor, the rise of China with its huge economic and 
human resources, the efforts by Japan-world’s second largest economy- to participate 
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in world affairs, and India with its enormous population and experience on high-tech 
industries are signs of multipolar structure. Polarization indicates opposition, but 
none of these formations oppose democratic values of the 21st century. Though 
implementations of democratic values may vary in these spots of power, at least 
there seems to be official consensus on such values.    
2.3. The Israeli-Turkish Alignment 
The Turkish-Israeli relations are one of the most discussed and current subjects 
in the Middle East since it have many repercussions in the region. The dissatisfaction 
of Turkey with its Arab neighbors since the beginning of the Cold War, changing 
threat perceptions of Turkey following the Cold War and the Arab-Israeli 
rapprochement in the post-Cold War are commonly believed to contribute to the 
development of Turkish-Israeli alignment. It can be argued that Turkish-Israeli 
alignment is a part of a new dimension in Turkish Foreign Policy as a result of the 
new international structure following the demise of Soviet Union. Turkey found 
itself surrounded with hostile neighbors in an unstable environment. Instability in the 
Middle East, adverse relations with Syria, the risk of Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(WMD) projects by its neighbors, the threat of fundamentalism, problematic 
relations with Europe, doubts about Russian intentions and propensity towards 
America can be laid down as factors that shaped Turkish-Israeli alignment from a 
broader perspective. 77  
The claim that Turkish-Israeli relations have developed in the form of 
“strategic alliance” with the participation of USA against Iran and Syria in the post-
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Cold War era came to the surface following the 1990/1991 Kuwait crisis.78 But is it 
really possible to assert that Turkey developed a “strategic alliance” with Israel in the 
post-Cold War era in the Middle East? Ismail Cem, the then Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, complained that there is deliberate exaggeration when Turkey’s relations 
with Israel are described as damaging to Turkey’s position in the Middle East. 79 At 
this point it is beneficial to discuss the post-Cold War and its repercussions for 
Turkey’s security. 
2.3.1. Developments in the Post-Cold War Era 
As the most critical point of all, survival and security have always been the 
main concerns of policymakers in uncertain and unstable environments.  
Accordingly, the Security dimension has always been the determinant factor 
which shaped Turkish Foreign Policy against the Middle East. To meet this end, 
Turkey benefited from the NATO shield and some regional organizations such as the 
Baghdad Pact (in 1955-1959) throughout the Cold War. During 1990 Kuwait crisis, 
Turkish policy makers watched with anxiety that European members of NATO were 
not as sensitive about Turkey’s defense concerns “in the event of a Muslim attack on 
Turkey” from the Middle East.80 Turkey’s deep dissatisfaction with the ambivalence 
shown by its Western European allies was well outlined by General Çevik Bir (Rtd.), 
who noted that “the same West which once described Turkey as a ‘staunch ally’ and 
a ‘bastion’ is now following a policy of excluding Turkey from the map of 
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Europe”.81 Beyond all the political rifts between Turkey and Europe, which were 
kept secret to some extent, were made public after the Cold War which caused 
tensions.  
Freed from the constraints of the Cold War era, Turkey seemed to have a better 
chance of playing bigger and different roles enhancing its strategic importance in the 
eyes of Western countries. On the contrary, in post-Cold War era the West, in 
general and Europe in particular, continued to perceive Turkey as an outpost for their 
own security. But in the same era the West can not be depicted as a compact unit 
since crack voices emerged. European countries initiated to establish their own army 
(European Security and Defense Project, ESDP), while the US tried to enhance 
NATO’s sphere of influence by commencing Partnership for Peace (PfP) programs. 
The diminishing effect of NATO, changing character of threat perceptions of Turkey, 
especially from some of its southern neighbors, and irredentist movements by PKK 
(a terrorist organization which is responsible of killing thousands of Turkish citizens) 
compelled Ankara to shift its security priorities from the North to South at the 
beginning of  the 1990s.82  
Meanwhile Turkey and the West diverged in defining their interests in the 
Middle East, which raised uncertainty for Turkey and resulted in mistrust between 
Turkey and its Western allies. 83 While western countries perceive the Middle East as 
an economic asset for its huge oil reserves and potential market for themselves, the 
region constitutes the top security concern of Turkey. Developments in the region 
caused Turkey to shift its threat perceptions from the North to South in the early 
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1990s. The power vacuum in Northern Iraq since the 1990 campaign which paved 
the way of a powerful PKK, ongoing water debacle with Syria and its backing for 
PKK were the main reasons of Turkey’s shifting policy. Thus, Turkey tried to find a 
regional solution to its Middle Eastern problems by pursuing ties with Israel. 
Additionally, domestic developments also had repercussions on Turkey’s 
foreign policy decisions in that era. Given the security dominated foreign policy of 
Turkey, the rising power of PKK and other terrorist activities that has trans-border 
connection also caused strains on relations with neighbors such as Syria, Iraq and 
Iran.84 
2.3.2. Enhanced Maneuverability 
All these factors instigated Turkey to make a rapprochement with Israel 
beginning from the 1990s which reached a climax in 1996. On February 23, 1996, 
Turkey and Israel signed a Military Training and Cooperation Agreement. The two 
countries also signed a Defense Industry Cooperation Agreement on August 26, 
1996. Despite the military character of agreements, Turkish-Israeli relations cannot 
be categorized as a traditional alliance since there is no formal and documented 
commitment to mutual defense and military cooperation. Even then the agreement 
had been made public two months after the signature. The two states did not define a 
casus feoderis85, which specifically identifies the situations that will necessitate them 
to undertake military assistance to one another in the event of an armed conflict.86 
Both countries shun participating in a crisis which has nothing to do with their 
respective national security and neither expects the other to take their side actively in 
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a conflict.87 Accordingly, Turkey, right from the beginning, opposed “polarization” 
in the Middle East through strategic alliances as a general policy. According to 
Marios Evriviades, it is erroneous to think that Turkey, who has always been in favor 
of peace, stability and comprehensive cooperation to the benefit of all peoples in the 
region - where the main problems and conflicts continue -, would create new 
concerns and further divisions. He continues that Turkish-Israeli cooperation, which 
does not target any third country, will contribute to regional peace and stability.88 
However, there are several crucial issues on which the Turkish and Israel 
policymakers diverge. This interest-based relation between two countries cannot 
shadow the emergence of controversial topics such as Iraq, improving relations of 
Turkey with its Arab neighbors lately and the water issue.89 Amikam Nachmani 
iterates that Israel had the same kind of special relations with France in the 1950s (to 
establish its nuclear program), Iran in the 1960s and 1970s essentially on energy and 
intelligence domains and South Africa in the 1970s and 1980s.90  So this relationship 
can be categorized as a special and conditional alignment with various beneficial 
results enhancing Turkey’s maneuverability in regional and international terms. 
In a post-Cold War world the two states have much to gain mutually without 
formally binding themselves. Though they lack formality, provisions of the 1996 
Agreement can open doors to a cooperation that can only be reached by allies.91 
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Doubtless, in the post-Cold War era Turkey emerged as a regional actor pursuing its 
interests to a considerable degree. 
This political and security condition in which Turkey can deter its regional 
adversaries without formal commitments to its friends and  without being dragged 
into the Middle East’s own internal conflicts in a fluid environment. This resembles 
Inönü’s foreign policy principles in the Second World War in terms of “freedom of 
maneuverability”. To avoid polarization In the Middle East Turkey desired to resolve 
problems through peace talks in conformity with international law, the principle of 
territorial integrity and mutual respect for national unity. 
According to Meliha Benli Altunışık, in 1996 and 1997 when the relations 
between the two countries were at an apex, Turkey was able to benefit from this 
relation by pressing its hostile neighbors who supported terrorist factions, which then 
constituted the main security concern of Turkey.92  The process, at the end of which 
the PKK terrorist leader, Abdullah Öcalan, was captured, was pursued with the help 
of Israel’s various security units both in terms of conventional forces and intelligence 
support. 93 In 1998, while Öcalan resided in Russia, it is believed that Israel provided 
Turkey with intelligence on his whereabouts. Publicly it was first reported in the 
Jerusalem Post. 
This is a clear sign of how Turkish-Israeli alignment served the regional 
interests of Turkey without bearing the burden of the stipulations of a classical 
alliance and enhanced its realm of maneuver in the Middle East. This alignment can 
not be categorized as a classical regional balance of power structure since the 
accumulative power of Israel and Turkey is far more than all other combinations in 
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the Middle East.94 In this respect the alignment can be explained with respective 
interests of Turkey and Israel in cooperation.  
2.3.3. Beginning of Relations 
Following the declaration of state of Israel in 1948, the Turkish-Israeli relations 
have been kept in “low-profile” due to Turkish foreign policy of “balance” and “non-
interventionism” toward the Middle East. While the Suez Crisis in 1956, 
proclamation of Jerusalem as the capital by Israel in 1980 and the well-known crisis 
between Israel and the Palestinian Authority in the Middle Eastern Peace Process 
caused some severe political repercussions, the two states have never ruptured 
bilateral relations.95 The need to fill the power vacuum in the Middle East after the 
demise of the Soviet Union and the changing character of threat perceptions of 
Turkey caused Ankara to reevaluate its traditional regional policy of non-
interference.96 In this respect, while Turkey’s foreign policy priorities are still firmly 
focused on its relations with the Western powers, Turkey responded to the 
developments in the Middle East with a somewhat more activist and assertive 
regional foreign policy.  
The Madrid peace process that started in October 1991 can be evaluated as an 
epoch whereby the impediments before Turkish-Israeli rapprochement were 
removed.97 In December 1991 Israel raised its diplomatic mission from Charge 
d’Affaires to Ambassadorial level to Ankara and Ankara reciprocated98 by upgrading 
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its diplomatic representation to ambassadorial level in both Israel and Palestine at the 
same time.99 The signing of the Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles (DOP) on 
September 13, 1993, turned the page to a new era in Turkish-Israeli relations. It 
seemed to have removed all obstacles to close bilateral relations. Israel’s recognition 
of the PLO-and the PLO’s of Israel meant that Ankara no longer had to restrain its 
ties with Tel Aviv in order to impress the Arab world.100  On October 14, 1993, came 
the visit of then Turkish Foreign Minister Hikmet Çetin. It was the first highest 
ranking Turkish officials’ visit since Turkey’s recognition of the state of Israel in 
1949.  
The first official declaration of the newly emerging rapprochement came from 
Çetin that was presented as a “New-Era in Turkish-Israeli relations”. It was 
reaffirmed by Çetin’s words “Turkish-Israeli relations will develop in all fields, we 
have agreed that Turkey and Israel should co-operate in restructuring the Middle East 
in 1993.101 
Then official visits followed Çetin’s visit after 1993. Israeli president Ezer 
Weizman’s visit to Turkey in January 1994, Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Çiller’s 
visit to Israel in November 1994, President Demirel’s visit to Israel in March 1996 
and a visit by Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz in September 1998 enhanced the 
relations. 
While there have been noteworthy developments in all fields, the most 
significant element of developing relations between two countries in the 1990s has 
been in the military domain. In 1996, Turkey negotiated and signed two military 
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agreements with Israel; the Military Training Cooperation agreement in February and 
the Defense Industry Agreement in July. The contents of military agreements still 
remain secret, but agreements are believed to provide a framework for expanded 
Israeli-Turkish cooperation in the areas of officer exchange, naval port calls, access 
to training area, joint air and naval training, counter terrorism, border security and 
joint defense industry.102 Modernization by the Israel Aircraft Industry (IAI) of  
Turkish planes fifty-four F-4s (Phantoms) and forty-eight F-5s with Israeli know-
how at a cost of 900 million dollars, the purchase of F-16 extra fuel tanks from 
Israel, joint production of Popeye missiles and a probable modernization of Turkish 
M-60 tanks are all negotiated based on the Military Agreements.103 Additionally 
intelligence ties are believed to be reinforced104. 
Joint training programs are included in the agreements. In January 1998, and in 
December 1999, joint naval exercises, the “Reliant Mermaid”, between Turkey and 
Israel with the participation of US took place. Some air-force exercises are practiced 
mutually.105 
But the relation can not be restricted to military domains. The civilian 
agreements the 1996 “Free Trade Agreement” which was ratified in April 1997, is 
the main component of commercial relations. The “Customs Agreement” in 
December 1996 and the “Trade Agreement” in June 1996, contributed to developed 
relations. 
 1990 1993 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
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Export 88.7 121.8 197.2 256.7 287.2 334.2 430.5 
Import 36.2 80.3 252.1 355.4 443.1 556.8 586.6 
 
Table 2.1. The Civilian Commerce of Israel with Turkey (million US $)106 
Despite the increasing numbers of bilateral trade, Israel is not an alternative for 
Iran and Arab markets for Turkey since the mutual trade volumes between Turkey 
and Israel constitute even less than two percent of the total annual trade volume of 
both countries.107 
2.3.4 .Motivations 
Different from the Cold-War era, in a multipolar world, alignments were 
established, in favor of member countries’ own interests in Middle East. Without any 
doubt, concerns about the respective national security of their countries have been 
the determinant factor that shaped the Turkish-Israeli alignment.108In this respect 
countries try to make non-binding but lucrative and beneficial agreements which 
provide them with freedom of maneuverability as much as possible. It is highly 
important to ensure one’s security while not binding oneself to formal documents or 
promises. When asked by his advisor to take Turkey into NATO in 1949, Inönü 
replied “can we get out of this organization if it harms our national interests?”109 This 
example clearly shows how a state can boost its maneuverability in the political 
arena. Likewise, despite their common goals, the difference in Turkey’s and Israel’s 
motivations in forming the alignment and their diverging positions in many crucial 
subjects proves this “maneuverability”. Diverging issue on topics will be mentioned 
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in order to comprehend the position of Turkey and how Ankara tried to use this 
alignment in favor of its interests.   
2.3.4. a. Turkey’s motivations 
Several factors have played a role in Turkey’s motive for boosting an alignment 
with Israel. Turkey never wants to lose initiative in the incessantly changing Middle 
East environment and wants to strengthen its defense against possible Arab blocs. 
With apprehension of their supposed decreasing strategic importance in post-Cold 
War era, Turkey and Israel desired to take part in the new order of the Middle East 
which was to be enforced by the USA110 in conformity with their respective national 
security.  
According to many scholars, Turkey could not attain what it expected from 
pro-Arab policies since the mid 1960s.111 In order to fulfill the expectations of Arab 
states, Turkey suspended its relations with Israel and supported the PLO at times. 
Ankara’s support for the Arab world provided Turkey with only an occasional 
progress in economic relations during the 1970s and 1980s, which diminished in the 
early 1990s.112 As Alan Makovsky puts it, Israel and Turkey share a “common sense 
of otherness” in a region dominated by Arabs and non-democratic regimes.113  
Under these circumstances an alignment with Israel on economic, political 
military and other domains would strengthen the position of Turkey against Arab 
states on one hand, and would help Turkey enhance its position as a regional actor by 
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improving its relations with the US. 114 This policy indicates that Turkish foreign 
policy can flex its muscles (to some extent) under certain conditions and create room 
to maneuver.   
Ankara’s Gulf War experience, when NATO responded to the danger of an 
Iraqi attack on Turkey only with reluctance since West Europeans saw NATO 
strictly as an organization for deterring conflicts inside Europe and had no intention 
of defending a peripheral NATO state115, caused some anxiety in Turkey about its 
security in regional and international terms. 
Turkey also wanted to break its isolation from the Western world which 
reached its apex with Turkey’s applicant rejection to European Union in 1997.  That 
signified EU as an unreliable partner for Turkey’s political and security worries. In 
this respect Turkey aspired to obtain the support of Jewish lobby which was depicted 
by Şükrü Elekdağ identified as “The Israel lobby in the US is far superior to all other 
ethnic lobbies put together. Whenever this lobby has worked for us (Turkey), 
Turkey’s interests have been perfectly protected.” Ankara evaluated this alignment as 
a compensation for Turkey’s weakening ties with EU in the context of a triangular 
relationship with the US.116  
But, Amikam Nachmani iterates that the Israeli efforts have achieved a limited 
success. He argues that while the US Administration is interested in closer ties with 
Turkey, the Congress remains critical. Given the stipulation of Congress approval on 
critical subjects as arms sales and financial aid, the function of Jewish lobby can be 
better evaluated. Thus Turkey’s returning to Middle East and Israel may be deemed 
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as a balancing factor to create maneuverability against EU and US Congress117 
though the availability of expected results is controversial. Though the major Turkish 
policy points to a balancing of Euro-Atlantic ties while reiterating a Middle Eastern 
balance.  
Another case for Turkey is the supersensitive issue of PKK terrorist 
organization. Israel, it should be noted, possess superior intelligence on Kurds 
because in the early 1970s Israeli advisors, in collaboration with the CIA and the 
Shah’s SAVAK, operated clandestinely in the Kurdish mountains with Kurdish 
guerrillas against Iraq.118 Gökhan Çetinsaya states that these rebels were able to 
engage a large number of Iraqi forces at that time.119 According to Turkish and 
Western sources and press reports, during the April 1996 forays against Hezbollah 
bases in Lebanon’s Bekaa valley, Israel targeted suspected bases of PKK.  
Besides the supply of intelligence on the activities of PKK in the region, Israel, 
together with US were to help Turkey electronically “seal” its borders with Syria, 
Iraq and Iran so as to stop the infiltrations of PKK terrorists.  There are many 
Kurdish Jews living in Northern Iraq. Even today there are about 30 high ranking 
Kurdish Jews in KDP (Kurdistan Democratic Party, a dissident to Iraqi regime)120. 
Turkey’s explicit goal is to reach the intelligence gathered by MOSSAD (Israel 
intelligence service), the satellite photographs or the other subsidiary organs in 
Northern Iraq to control the activities of PKK. Contrary to some claims that Israeli 
security units help Turkish Forces within the borders of Turkey to gather intelligence 
seems illogical since this kind of an operation needs a trans-border dimension and the 
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Turkish-Israeli military agreements   inhibit the involvement of the soldiers of either 
signatory on the territory of the other in conflicts between the host state and any third 
party.121Surely, this can be done with physical contact. 
Syria was known to support this terrorist organization along with some other 
neighbors. Syria even provided shelter for the leader of the organization for many 
years. Damascus also signed an unsubstantiated agreement with Greece in July 1995 
which opened Syrian air and naval bases to the latter. In military terms, this 
agreement may have harmed Turkey’s interests in Mediterranean. Şükrü Elekdağ 
commented that Turkey should be ready to wage a war with Greece, Syria and PKK 
at the same time.122 An Israeli support to coordinate strategies against Syria-or more 
accurately, Syrian perception that such coordination might exist-would complicate 
Syria’s own strategic planning and its approach to peacemaking with Israel, its 
support for terrorism, and perhaps other policies as well.123  The extradition of 
Öcalan and the signing of the “Text of Minutes” in Adana between Turkey and Syria 
on October 20, 1998 seemed to stop Syria’s classical water-terror approach. 
According to Nachmani, these occasions may have signaled to Greece the futility of 
aligning with Syria.  
In May 1997 Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu condemned the 
Kurdish terrorism and maneuvers to establish a Kurdish state. He even went further 
claiming that there would be no peace between Israel and Syria unless Syria quits 
giving support to PKK.124 However, these claims did not reverberate in the actions of 
Israel. Amikam Nachmani argues that Israel declined the Turkish request to take 
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sides against Kurdish terrorism. He argued that anti-terror efforts were excluded 
from the 1994 agreement since Israelis found the definition of “terrorism” combined 
with the term “Kurdish” unacceptable.125 In essence, Israel would not want to add yet 
another terrorist organization against itself. 
Turkey, in the same era, iterated its concerns of a probable proposal by the US 
to compensate Syria for water from the Golan Heights that Damascus had to give to 
Israel in order to facilitate the Syria-Israel peace agreements.126 In the same era, not 
to be ousted from the peace process and to prevent unwanted results for itself, 
Turkey offered Israel the Military Agreement.127 This was not a result of confidence 
in Israel against a Syrian threat since two countries had different perceptions 
pertaining Syria.  Accordingly, when security is concerned, Turkey could not trust 
Israel totally.128 Israeli President Ezer Weizmann, during a visit to Greek Cyprus in 
1998 iterated that if the Turkish-Syrian tension increased, Israel can not be seen as a 
second front against Syria.129 However, to bear in mind, Turkey enhanced its 
maneuverability since it was able to change Syria’s threat perception to some degree 
which can be seen in the Öcalan case. 
Turkey perceived terrorism as the most ostensible impediment before the 
Middle East Peace Process and regional instability to which it paid considerable 
attention. Therefore Ankara tolerated the Israeli military operations in Lebanon 
against Hamas and other terrorist organizations, while there are certain differences 
                                                 
125 Ibid, p.204 
126 Mahmut Bali Aykan. Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Dönemi Ortadoğu’sunda Türkiye’nin İsrail’e Karşı 
Politikası:1991-1998. (Turkey’s Foreign Policy toward Israel in post-Cold War Middle East) 
(İstanbul: Yeditepe University, 2000), p.38 
127 Wolfango Piccoli. Alliance Theory: The Case of Turkey and Israel. (Unpublished MA Thesis in 
Bilkent University, June 1999), p.58 
128 Mahmut Bali Aykan. Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Dönemi Ortadoğu’sunda Türkiye’nin İsrail’e Karşı 
Politikası:1991-1998. (Turkey’s Foreign Policy toward Israel in post-Cold War Middle East) 
(İstanbul: Yeditepe University, 2000), p.38 
129 Ahmet Davutoğlu. Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye’nin Uluslararası Konumu(Strategic 
Depth:International Position of Turkey). (İstanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2001), p.424 
 49 
between the struggle by Israel against Hezbollah and Hamas and Turkey’s efforts to 
suppress PKK. 130 
Self-sufficiency in military terms means to be able to produce the needed 
equipment and weapons in a given country, whatever kind, without the help of 
another state. According to General Şadi Ergüvenç (Ret), “perhaps the most rational 
explanation for Turkey’s recent rapprochement with Israel”131 is Turkey’s desire to 
become a more self-sufficient regional power in economic and military domains. He 
continues that given the unreliable security structure of Europe, military cooperation 
with Israel turned out to be an obligation for Turkey. This approach represents the 
aspiration of Turkey to decrease its dependency on other states for military 
equipments, spare parts or weapons since many states which supply military 
equipment, stipulate the improvement of human rights in Turkey or some 
suggestions on Kurdish issue, such as a political solution to the problem.  
At this point, there is another important subject as an impediment related to the 
development of a national weaponry industry. The transfer of Israeli technology or 
weapon systems that were developed with American participation is subject to US 
Congressional approval, which is not always granted.132 Israel develops its missile 
technology that it is heavily dependent on US technology.  
2.3.4. b .Israeli Motivations and Common Goals 
Israel also has many some security concerns. Realizing that it is a small state 
surrounded by numerous Arab countries, the help of extraregional powers has also 
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been sought to offset asymmetries in resources with the Arab world.133 To form close 
relations with a non-Arab Muslim country can contribute to alleviate the “religion” 
dimension of Arab-Israeli conflict which is an aim of Israeli foreign policy.134 Efforts 
to find markets for high-tech Israeli weapons constitute another dimension of the 
relations. To preempt possible missile attacks from hostile regional countries, Israel 
needs Turkey’s airspace. 135 
As for common goals, whichever state intends to launch an attack against either 
country must take into consideration the combined military strength of Turkey and 
Israel. Intelligence exchange between the two countries, which is gathered through 
border observations and surveillance oriented flight missions, lessen the probability 
of a surprise attack by their hostile mannered neighbors136. 
Iran’s desire to export its Islamic revolution to Turkey, its relations with Syria 
and information confirming its support to organizations which are declared 
“terrorist” by Israel and Turkey cause some parallelism in both countries’ threat 
perceptions pertaining to Iran.  
 It is long known that Iran supplies Hezbollah and PKK terrorist fractions with 
military equipment against Israel and Turkey respectively137. That in June 2000 
Turkey demanded that the cargo of Iranian aircrafts, en-route to Turkey, be reported 
to Turkish officials and immediate condemnation by Iran is a clear indication for 
Israel about Iran’s support to terrorism. İsmail Hakkı Karadayı, Turkey’s then Chief 
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of Staff, during a visit to Israel in February 1997 stated: “The priority issue of this 
cooperation should be the struggle against international terrorism”138. 
2.4. Controversial Issues 
According to Mahmut Bali Aykan, Considering Turkey’ point of view, two 
hypotheses lie under the alignment. At first, a change in regional and international 
circumstances which stipulated the Turkish-Israeli alignment is not expected to alter 
in near future. For example, there was an uncertainty regarding the behavior of 
Greece-Syria cooperation on terrorist activities against Turkey with the help of the 
Russian Federation. Turkish-Israeli alignment would form a guarantee and a 
deterrent factor for Turkey’s security.  Secondly, the continuity of the Arab-Israeli 
Peace Process was to be assured, though some intervals were expected independent 
from the Israeli political parties in power.139 It can not be argued that Turkey would 
severe its bilateral relations with Syria and other regional states while forming close 
ties with Israel which proves that Turkey perceived its alignment with Israel as a 
“tool” not the “aim” of its Middle East policy.140  As Hikmet Cetin, then the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, stressed in 1993, Turkey perceives Turkish-Israeli rapprochement 
not as a pact against a common enemy but as an alignment for deterrence141 which 
was proven in the cases of Syria and Greek Cypriot efforts to deploy Russian-made 
S-300 missiles in Cyprus. While not confirmed officially, concerns that the Turkish 
pilots were trained in Israel with sophisticated attack capabilities and rumors about a 
possible attack on S-300 missile positions if they were deployed on Cyprus Island 
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with the help of these trainings created the expected result for Turkey in 1998. 
Cengiz Çandar, a commentator on foreign policy, confirms this attitude by arguing 
that the isolation of Turkey from its other neighbors will harm its interests in the long 
run. According to him, Turkey should find some grounds to cooperate with other 
surrounding countries whether Arab or not. This does not mean that Turkey will 
suspend relations with Israel or relinquish them.  
Despite the existence of controversial issues between the two countries both 
Israel and Turkey learned to stabilize the direction of the alignment. But during this 
era some issues were avoided or not even articulated, and Turkey was able to reach 
its targets, to a considerable degree, without being dragged into the hot debates of the 
Middle East such as the Palestinian-Israeli dispute or Syrian-Israeli peace process. 
Ankara also did not have to make concessions from its general principles such as 
changing the volume of water given to Syria, from its transboundary water courses, 
such as the Euphrates. Israel desired to satisfy Syria with water from Turkey through 
Euphrates in order to assure its water reserves from Golan Heights during the Peace 
Process. 
Besides, extradition of the PKK leader and some 300-400 PKK members from 
Syria and later developments drew a new path in Turkish-Syrian relations. With the 
coming of Bashar Assad to power on July 11, 2000, a new era of bilateral relations 
commenced. Improved relations were seen with the visit of Syrian Chief of Staff to 
Ankara in June 2002. 142 During the visit of Syrian President Bashar Assad to Turkey 
in January 2004, Damascus officially declared to abolish its claims on 
Alexandretta.143 The Vice President of Syria, Abdulhalim Haddam, declared that 
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Damascus is ready for negotiations with Israel in conformity with the resolutions of 
the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and stated that the messages declaring 
Syria’s desire to continue peace talks have been transmitted to Abdullah Gül, the 
Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs.144 This event implies that Syria wants Turkey to 
be a mediator in peace talks. The Spokesman of the Israeli Foreign Ministry Jonathan 
Peled stated “We accepted Turkey’s offer to be a mediator in Syrian-Israeli peace 
talks and we think that Turkey can play a crucial role”.145 Turkey’s close relations 
with Israel gave Ankara an important opportunity to play an active role in an event 
from which it feared to be ousted in the mid-1990s. Turkey obviously broadened its 
sphere of influence and was able to benefit from its relations with Israel to become a 
mediator.  
When, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared the PKK as a 
terrorist organization and condemned its activities there were a persistent pro-
Kurdish sentiment in Israel which caused reservations till 1997. Currently Israel 
gives extensive support for the Kurdish struggle for independence in northern Iraq. 
146According to Alon Liel, Israeli Ambassador (Ret), there would be a weak 
federation in Iraq though a separation would not occur. He stated that Northern Iraq 
(Kurds) is a friend of Israel. While he depicts Turkey as the only regional friend of 
Israel Liel warns that Turkey should be ready for such phenomenon like a “separated 
Iraq”. 147Israel also helped Kurdish groups in northern Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war 
(1980-1987) by organizing forces to engage a large number of the Iraqi Army. Ariel 
Sharon, then Israeli Foreign Secretary, stated in 1999, “It is a known fact that we 
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have good relations with the Kurds in Northern Iraq and especially with Barzani, but 
we do not have relations with PKK.”148 In this respect, some claims were raised in 
the Turkish media such as buying land in huge amounts in northern Iraq by Kurds 
with the help of Israeli financing. 149According to Meliha Benli Altunışık, today the 
stance of Israel towards Iraq is different from that of Turkey and the developments in 
Iraq will directly effect Israeli-Turkish relations.150 Until now Turkey was able to 
make Israel recognize PKK as a terrorist faction and pursued its relations in 
cooperation without taking Iraq into the agenda of bilateral relations. 
According to Ahmet Davutoğlu, there is not an issue in the Middle East, either 
an agreement or peace talks, independent from the water issue. He continues that all 
wars are related to attain water resources and all peace talks are subject to 
distribution of water reserves.151 Different approaches by Turkey and Israel towards 
the water issue signify that the two countries may part on so crucial a subject which 
refutes the claims about “strategic alliance” between them.152 Turkey, the only 
country in the region with a water surplus, rapidly became the focal point of the 
Middle East water planning with considerable energy devoted to figuring out how to 
supply Israel with water from rivers in Southern Turkey.153 The water reserves of 
Israel are diminishing with increasing demand. Turkey’s water is deemed as a 
feasible and available alternative for Israel. In April 2001 the Israeli government 
made an agreement with Turkey on supplying water from Manavgat River for 50 
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million cubic meters annually.154 But, Israel does not want to become dependent on 
Turkey for water as a general policy. Water has an increasing value in Middle East, 
thus raising the worth of Turkey’s cards in the region. Turkey may benefit from the 
water card in northern Iraq by Tigris, in the event of an independent Kurdish state, 
and in Syria, if a political increpancy between Ankara and Damascus enhances, by 
Euphrates Rivers since these are the main water sources of the region.  
        The signing of another military agreement between Greece and Israel, which 
resembles the Israeli-Turkish military agreement, indicates that Israel does not 
perceive the Turkish-Israeli relations as an alliance. Given the chronic problems 
between Ankara and Athens, it seems that Tel Aviv desires to find markets for its 
military products through these agreements.155 In the same context, Israel and Turkey 
discussed the proposal of broadening cooperation on national security during the visit 
of İlhan Kılıç, then Commander of Turkish Air Force, in December 1998. During the 
meetings, a formal defense agreement did not seem probable while to broaden 
cooperation was deemed a better option. According to Efraim Inbar, Israel did not 
believe in signed documents and even avoided signing a defense agreement with the 
US lest it could restrict Israel’s freedom of maneuverability. He continues that 
Turkey’s agenda did not include a more formal agreement of alliance with Israel 
anyway.156 Given that the Greece-Israeli military agreement was signed in 1994, by 
signing a similar agreement, Turkey counter-balanced the rising power of the Greek 
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Army and preempted a possible plot against itself since Israel wants to become a 
supplier of the Greek Cypriot Army following Russia and France.157 
2.5. Broadened Impact 
Joining of Jordan to Turkish-Israeli alignment increased its sphere of influence. 
Its importance lies in the fact that the alignment was not established against Arab 
countries as an anti-Arab bloc. While Jordan had military ties with Turkey since 
1984 this reached the apex with a 1996 secret military cooperation agreement. 
According to Amikam Nachmani, Turkish-Jordanian military cooperation turned out 
to be an intensive interaction, “the most significant cooperation of Turkey other than 
NATO.” 158  Many Jordanian officers are being trained in the Turkish Army and 
Turkish officers join exercises in Jordan. 
2.6. Reactions to Alignment 
In the Arab world it is really hard to talk about a consensus as to how to react to 
Turkish-Israeli cooperation. Though in general Arab countries expressed their 
anxieties about the alignment, the policies of Arab countries varied from joining the 
cooperation to exert great endeavor to isolate and contain Turkey and Israel. Most 
Arab countries despised the Turkish-Israeli relationship. Moreover they depicted the 
alignment as an extension of American and Western attempts to promulgate their 
hegemony over the region. Historical roots that are full of enmity between Arabs and 
Turkey spurred Arab hatred159. They even evaluated this alignment and Turkey’s 
activities in the Middle East as “new Ottomanism”. The backlash of the Arab 
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community involves “alienation, denying the legitimacy of alignment and to 
establish counter coalitions”160.  
Arab complaints have also revealed the security priorities of reactionary 
countries. Syria, possibly the most affected one, accused Turkey and Israel of 
forming a “military alliance” against itself for fear of being a target. The Libyan 
news agency worried about this “suspicious military partnership” that would steal 
Arabs’ petroleum and water resources. The Iranians worried about Israel’s current 
capability of targeting their nuclear facilities.161  The involvement of Jordan in the 
alignment brought about the establishment a counter-bloc which includes Syria, 
Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the PLO at least in the rhetorical realm. In a parallel way, 
Iran tried to renew the possibilities of cooperation with Armenia and Russia against 
Turkey as it did during Nagorno-Karabakh conflicts in 1993. But the vitality and 
durability of mentioned counter-blocs are still subject to discussion. 
That the contents of alignment are not known to Arabs also revived and 
increased their preexisting fears. Above all while risks are always present against the 
Turkey-Israel alignment, the mentioned regional reactions and the threats of counter-
alliances will be mostly confined to the verbal domain162. The reliability and 
operability of these counter-alliances are also limited given the old enmities between 
war-torn Arab countries. But it is clear that every attempt of cooperation between 
Turkey and Israel was attacked by countries mentioned. Turkey’s project of selling 
water to Israel from Manavgat River was subjected to criticisms of Arab countries 
during the meeting of Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Arab League in 
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March 1996 despite the fact that the project had nothing to do with the water disputes 
between Turkey-Iraq and Syria.163 
The Agreement that was signed between Iran, Greece and Armenia could be 
evaluated as a maneuver against Turkish-Israeli alignment especially targeting 
Turkey since Greece is on good terms with Israel.164 Additionally, in 1998 the Greek 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Theodoros Pangalos, depicted the alignment as “alliance 
of the guilty parties” implying Turkey and Israel, and joined the triple meeting in 
Tehran with Ministers Foreign Affairs of Armenia and Iran.165 
All in all it is hard to talk bout a robust and powerful counter-bloc by states 
who stated their anxiety about Turkish-Israeli alignment. Reactionary states diverge 
on the method of backlash since their respective national interests do not converge. 
The improvement of relations between Syria and Turkey with the visit of Bashar 
Assad is a historical development given the hostile policies of Hafez Assad during 
the 1980s and 1990s. Syria gives an impression that if it tries to solve its problems 
with its neighbors. 
Currently, Turkey also has a relatively unproblematic relation with Iran. 
President Khatami has a positive impact on relations between the two countries by 
relegating to the backburner some state policies such as exporting the Islamic regime 
to neighboring countries. Turkey has close ties with Iran especially in commerce and 
energy.166  According to Gökhan Çetinsaya, relations between Turkey and Iran have 
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never been better than today. 167 But on the other hand, though officially denied by 
Iranian officials, it is suspected that there are thousands of PKK terrorists on Kandil 
mountains in the Iranian border region with Iraq.  
Consequently, despite Turkey’s improving relations with states such as Syria 
and Iran, the dilemma of regional multipolarity, “today’s friend may turn out to be 
tomorrow’s enemy”, coerced Turkey to protect and even to broaden its alignment 
with Israel.  We are leaving the age of alliances. To develop close relations, provided 
that a country’s interests are protected, is a more convenient method than binding 
oneself to strict stipulations which may create other enemies and counter-alliances. 
After the Cold War, we can not talk about an alliance either in Middle East or on 
global terms. Many states pursue their interests, be they on security or economic 
terms, by forming close relations or improving their already established connections. 
In this context, Turkish-Israeli relations provided Turkey with an enhanced 
maneuverability in its relations with Syria, Iran and some other regional states.  
Finally, does this alignment really target Iran? How did Turkish-Israeli 
relations affect Turkish-Iranian relations in the post-Cold War environment? It can 
not be argued that Turkish-Israeli alignment directly targeted Iran and Turkish-
Iranian relations present a continuity beginning from the 16th century despite the 
existence of small intervals. This trend tends to continue even after the Turkish-
Israeli Military Agreement.  In the next chapter the questions above will be discussed 
from a historical perspective.  
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CHAPTER III: 
THE IMPACT OF TURKISH-ISRAELI ALIGNMENT ON TURKISH-
IRANIAN RELATIONS 
 
To be able to understand the impact of Turkish-Israeli alignment on Turkish-
Iranian relations it is necessary to look at the general nature of Turkish-Iranian 
relations.   All in all if the relations between Turkey and Israel are to be called an 
“alliance” it is supposed to cause a change in Iranian foreign policy patterns towards 
Turkey.  
It was generally thought that the Islamic Revolution in Iran were to 
constitute a severe rupture in Turkey-Iranian relations and was logically expected 
that Turkey and Iran would be in conflict owing to different interests, camps and 
ideological orientations. It is an undeniable fact that the changing regime in Iran and 
its new policy of exporting the Islamic Revolution to other Muslim countries 
comprised a strain in bilateral relations. Nevertheless, as Gökhan Çetinsaya argues, 
in shaping the Turkish-Iranian relations the basic determinant instruments have 
traditionally been geography, history, religious differences, strategic and 
geopolitical values, and conditions stemming therefrom.168  
In this context Turkish-Iranian relations show continuity despite changing 
regimes and administrations right from the beginning of the Safavid dynasty in the 
16th century since historical ties were established between the two countries.   
3.1. A Brief Evaluation of Relations Prior to the Revolution 
Until the 20th century, the rivalry between Sunni Ottoman and Shi’i Persia 
characterized of Turkey-Iranian relations. Leadership of the Islamic world was the 
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significant motivation of both empires. While avoiding waging a direct war against 
the Ottomans, especially when it was at its peak, Iran was successful in mobilizing 
small dissident groups inside Ottoman lands. Though more powerful than Iran 
militarily, the Ottoman Empire had to take into consideration the policy to conduct 
against Iran while fighting Western powers and Russia on other fronts. The nature of 
traditional relations had not changed after the Great War with the establishment of a 
new republic in Turkey in 1923 and the Pahlavi dynasty in Iran in 1924.169  
Until the Islamic Revolution in 1979, despite the legacy of conflict Turkey-
Iranian relations pursued an unproblematic path. As Atilla Eralp argues, shared 
threat perceptions, namely the “red threat” and the same inclinations to be a modern 
Western type of state were the main instigators of good relations.170 Another 
comment from John Calabrese indicates that at the core of Turkish and Iranian threat 
perceptions existed the containment of unfriendly neighbors171, implying Soviet 
threat.  
After the consolidation period, old grievances prevailed between the two 
regimes. Turkey was anxious about a probable Iranian manipulation of Kurdish 
nationalism as was the case in the previous century and Iran was concerned that its 
Azeri population’s upsurge was the result of Turkish exploitation. The Kurdish card 
would be played in several ways and times by Iranian regimes regardless of their 
ideology and became an unchanging dimension of bilateral strain after the Islamic 
Revolution as before.  
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Yet, World War II and the occupation of Iran by Allied forces once more 
interrupted relations between two countries. After the war, the two countries’ 
commitment to modernization and secularism had created an ideological affinity.172 
In accordance with this affinity and Cold War polarization, Turkey and Iran had 
been the only Muslim countries to recognize the state of Israel immediately after its 
establishment in 1948 and instituted official relations and Israel developed its 
relations with Iran in the context of Ben-Gurion’s policy of peripheral pact with 
non-Arab regional countries. 
During the Cold War, both countries felt threatened by the Communist 
Soviets and turned their face to the West to seek shelter. Turkey joined NATO and 
CENTO, Iran CENTO. The Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD), which 
came short of expectations, was established with a hope to boost economic and 
technical cooperation.The oil crisis of 1973-1974 was, in fact, a source of a serious 
divergence between Turkey and Iran. This development led to an armament policy 
by the Shah to enhance Iran’s political weight in the region at the expense of 
deteriorating relations with Turkey.  
The increase of Islamic opposition and dissatisfaction among people came to 
the surface obviously in the late 1970s in Iran as a political struggle between leftist 
and rightist groups constituted major domestic problems in Turkey, both of which 
resulted in drastic political changes; an Islamic Revolution in Iran and a military 
coup in Turkey, in 1979 and 1980 respectively. 
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3.2. The Islamic Revolution and Turkey’s Attitude 
The revolutionary process in Iran gained momentum in the middle of the 
1970s. While the sociological aspects of the revolution are beyond the scope of this 
study, internal dynamics of Iran during the Shah Regime have to be mentioned 
briefly to be able to grasp the underpinnings of and necessities for such a widespread 
and deep-rooted Revolution. 
 At first, the hardliners in Iran had the support of Bazaari (the merchants and 
small scale traders) who are the backbone of Iranian economy. They always had a 
say in internal and foreign affairs in Iranian political life, which was legitimized by a 
huge support of the majority of Iranians. Secondly, economic and sociological 
pressure on Iranian citizens which were basically high unemployment and strict 
Persian cultural hegemony over other ethnic entities, dissatisfaction caused by the 
Shah’s arbitrary treatment and economic privileges for his protégées, juridical 
immunities for foreigners(for American oil company personnel)173 paved the way 
for the Revolution. Fourth, the Iranian Army, while one of the most powerful in the 
Gulf after the increase in oil prices, was highly criticized for not winning a single 
war and protecting not Iran but the Shah himself and his régime. Consequently 
clerics convinced the people that under the ulama’s leadership economic 
development and political reform were more likely to be realized. Immediately after 
the revolution hardliners dominated political life and exterminated or ousted the 
leftist groups, such as the Tudeh party, Mujaheddin-e-Khalq174 and Fedayan-e-
Khalq and the Shah supporters in the process of Islamization of the revolution..  
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The very fact of the Revolution argued in this study is that it formed a severe 
political crisis and a turning point in foreign policy tendencies based on different 
threat and opportunity perceptions between the two countries. While a supporter of 
the status quo in the region before the Revolution, Iran turned out to be a 
radical/revolutionist state. It adopted a policy of absolute neutrality against the 
Soviets and the US and Islamization of foreign policy within the context of “neither 
West, nor East”. It envisaged a new regional order through exporting the regime. 
But in time, as Çetinsaya argues it abandoned theoretical rhetoric due to its 
unchanging regional interests, orienting its foreign policies in accordance with 
regional and international developments.175 
On February 13, 1979 Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit’s government 
immediately recognized it as the legitimate administration while there were some 
fears on the Turkish side over the ‘the export of the regime’ efforts of Iran. Turkey’s 
first concern as a neighbor was about a possible Soviet intervention or Communist 
takeover in Iran which would be harmful for Turkey’s security interests.  
Another important point for Ankara is the territorial integrity of Iran 
regarding the Kurdish question. Right after the revolution there were many Kurdish 
uprisings in Iran. Iranian Kurds had experienced a Soviet backed state, the short-
lived Mahabad Republic, in 1946 and were looking forward to establishing another 
one. Turkey perceived these developments as a threat thinking that they could spark 
similar activities by Kurds in Turkey.176  
Taking into consideration the activities of hard-liners in Iran, Turkey tried to 
hinder a probable polarization which would damage its regional interests and 
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galvanize the radical-Islamic groups in Turkey to the detriment of the uncompleted 
Westernization process.177  Though Turkey pursued correct and impartial policies, 
the Islamic revolutionaries perceived Turkey as an ally of the West and criticized it 
for acting in the interests of the U.S.178  
All in all, the hostile nature of the Islamic republic’s foreign policy toward 
secular and Kemalist Turkey was much related to the identity (anti-secular) of the 
regime. Within the same context, the Islamic revolutionaries declared Israel as an 
‘enemy to be destroyed’ determining Jerusalem as the final target of Iran-Iraq war 
and stood against Arab monarchs, whom it thought to be in collaboration  with the 
U.S.  But the same Islamic Regime did not hesitate to buy weapons and military 
equipment from the “Little Satan” Israel covertly during its war with Iraq179, an open 
proof for the pragmatic policies of Tehran and not Islamic ones. 
3.3. An Overall Assessment of 1980-1989: An Age of Neutrality 
The Iran-Iraq war changed not perceptions but the way of foreign policy 
making once again between the two countries. Iraqi armed forces attacked Iran 
occupying a significant portion of the country on September 22, 1980. The military 
administration of Turkey immediately declared neutrality towards the eight-year-
long war. With “active neutrality” policy Turkey refrained from policies that Iran 
could consider hostile despite Western states’ pressure on Turkey. Turkish policy 
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makers thought that constructive engagement was the best means of moderating the 
challenges posed by the Iranian revolution180 and the war. 
Turkey’s neutrality and its trade with Iran during the war impeded an 
unavoidable Iranian defeat against Iraqi forces, breaking down the isolation of Iran 
by the U.S. embargo. Therefore Iran chose realistic policies and refrained from 
stressing ideological ambitions against Turkey, at least officially, giving boost to 
economic relations in this era 
Turkish Foreign Minister Vahit Halefoğlu stated, “Iran should not be 
isolated. Turkish-Iranian relations should be understood within the context of its 
special condition.”181 The background of this statement lied in the fact that Turkey 
badly needed economic relations and trade with Iran and Iraq was an urgent 
necessity at that time.  
Though adopting the neutrality policy and benefiting from increasing 
economic relations, Turkey had some anxieties over chronic security issues. First of 
all, the use of Kurds by two warring parties bilaterally during the war constituted a 
great concern to Turkey that belligerent policies of both sides might give rise to 
Kurdish demands of independence in Turkey. Secondly, while causing decrease to 
some degree this war did not bring to a standstill the policy of exporting the Islamic 
revolution by Iran. 
However, Ankara and Tehran were committed to limiting damage to the 
bilateral relationship and exploiting the situation for the sake of economic gain and 
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security which are the tenets of realistic and pragmatic policies two countries 
pursued toward each other.182 
3.3.1. Economic Relations 
The Commercial Agreement of October 13, 1956, and the Economic and 
Technical Cooperation Agreement (ECTA) of March 9, 1982 characterized the 
framework of economic relations between the two countries.183 The Iranian 
revolution did not alter the nature of economic relations. Even after the revolution, 
Turkish decision makers never thought of interrupting relations since hostile 
engagement with Iran was not in the interest of Turkey.  
In 1981 and 1982 barter agreements were signed according to which Turkey 
would buy oil from Iran with its own exports.184 The revival of dormant Regional 
Cooperation for Development (RCD) under the name of Economic Cooperation 
Organization (ECO) on 28 January 1985 was in favor of both countries’ interests. As 
a result of decreasing oil prices at world markets and fall in Iranian oil income there 
was a sharp decrease in trade in 1986. Another reason was the demand by Iran to 
sell non-oil goods contrary to agreements. The end of the war, increasing instability 
in the Middle East and a shift toward European markets by Turkish entrepreneurs, 
coupled Iran’s desire to lessen its dependency on Turkey were among many other 
major reasons which resulted in a decrease in Turkish-Iranian economic relations.  
3.3.2. The Kurdish Issue and Efforts to Export the ‘Regime’ 
Both countries have a significant Kurdish population in their boundaries and 
experienced many Kurdish rebellion. Given the ‘restricted’ nature of Turkish-Iranian 
relations both countries in the same geography tried to curb the other’s influence 
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regionally and bilaterally. Putting the Kurdish issue in the same context Reza Shah 
tried to force Turkey to settle some controversial issues with Iran by using the 
‘Kurdish card’ which turned out to be futile after the Ararat rebellion and the 1932 
Turco-Iranian Frontier Treaty. During the Iran-Iraq war, Iran actively assisted Iraqi 
Kurds to help them engage some Iraqi forces, up to 160,000, and rebel against the 
Baghdad regime. During those years increasing Iranian existence in Northern Iraq 
caused some anxieties in Turkey since Iranian manipulations might intensify 
Kurdish nationalism and destabilize Turkey.185  
In 1983 increasing Kurdish separatist activities in the Southeastern region 
compelled Turkey to sign a ‘hot pursuit’ agreement with Baghdad thereby making 
the Iraqi territory more difficult to be used by the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). 
While rejecting a Turkish proposal for the same kind of accord, Tehran concluded 
an agreement in November 1984 committing each side to prevent activities on its 
territory which threatened the security of the other, to allay Turkey’s concerns. 
Turkey has been aware of Iran’s involvement in terrorism, mainly PKK for Turkey, 
but has been reluctant to make this the basis of an outright breach between the 
neighboring states.186   
Following the 1984 agreement with Iraq, the main Iranian concern was the 
increasing influence of Turkey in Northern Iraq and accused Turkey of the desire to 
seize the oil-rich Mosul and Kirkuk regions and of losing its neutrality, especially 
after consecutive Turkish air force attacks against PKK positions in Northern Iraq.  
Another issue between the two countries is the way of tackling their 
respective Kurdish populations. Olson argues that assassinating Kurdish leaders or 
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potential leaders was a means that Iranian governments pursued up to the 1990s.187 
As an intersecting point both countries are against an independent Kurdish state on 
their neighboring territory, conscious of probable threats which will be posed by 
such an entity.  
Exporting the Islamic regime to other countries and carrying it out in the 
direction of supranational interests of an Islamic country is considered an inevitable 
mission.188 This can be seen in article 3 of the Iranian constitution which stipulates a 
foreign policy based on Islamic criteria and unsparing protection for the under-
privileged and deprived people of the world. Mostly, different ideological 
orientations were articulated in both countries’ press rather than by governments or 
politicians. But in some occasions such as Iranian Prime Minister Mir Hussain 
Musavi’s refusal to visit Atatürk’s mausoleum-a protocol “must” during his summer 
1987 visit, Iranian Embassy’s not lowering its flag to half-mast to commemorate the 
50th anniversary of Atatürk’s death, Salman Rushdie’s Satanic Verses affair, and 
foiling of a plot of smuggling of a prominent Iranian regime dissident from Turkey 
in which Iranian embassy members were caught red-handed increased the tension 
between the two countries.  
Besides the secular state and Atatürk’s reforms, Turkey’s recognition189 and 
relations with the state of Israel posed another dimension of Iran’s criticism, through 
the radio broadcasts. These acts can be construed as political rather than theological, 
as an issue of identity and an instrument of legitimacy for domestic consumption. 
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Despite all these developments between the two countries, officials chose to 
mitigate tension. During the 1980s all problems were managed for the sake of 
economic benefits, as it was the case for fear of possible Soviet invasion of Iran 
within the first years of the revolution.   Both countries saw that there are no 
alternatives for themselves respectively and absolutely understood that they could 
choose their allies but not neighbors. So they found ways to manage their 
differences in spite of their different ideologies and dissimilar ways of conducting 
foreign policy as they did throughout centuries.  
But some regional and international developments in the late 1980s and 
beginning of the 1990s changed the perceptions of Iran and Turkey in some respect 
though not affecting the competitive nature of bilateral relations. Following is an 
analysis of the repercussions of these developments on relations between the two 
countries.  
3.3. Changing International and Regional Dynamics 
In July 1988, Iran sued for peace in its brutal eight-year long war with Iraq 
from which Iran suffered much and directed its policies accordingly especially in 
economic and military spheres. Decreasing regional economic relations of Iran with 
Turkey due to its diminishing oil revenues got worse with giving economic priorities 
to Europe, especially Germany.190 Here lies another fact that Iran wanted to lessen 
its dependence on Turkey even for daily goods. 
The spiritual leader Khomeini died on 3 June, 1989. He was succeeded by 
Ayatollah Khamanei. With the election of Ali Akbar Rafsanjani as president in 
1989, a new and realistic policy inclination took pace. Iran decided to break its 
isolation which lasted since the declaration of the Islamic Regime as a priority in its 
                                                 
190Atilla Eralp and Özlem Tür.. “İranla Devrim Sonrası İlişkiler” in Türkiye ve Ortadoğu: Tarih, 
Kimlik,Güvenlik. eds.Meliha Benli Altunışık ,(İstanbul: Boyut Kitapları, 1999), p.78 
 71 
foreign policy. Constructive diplomacy, economic and military reformation were the 
main instruments of these pragmatic policies. Economic needs gained priority over 
the ideology of Islamic regime because of a long war and deprivation in the country.  
The end of the Cold War and new opportunities facing Iran with the 
dissolution of Soviet Union caused some strain in its relations with Turkey. Many 
disputes that were downplayed by the two countries during the Cold War era due to 
economic, security and political necessities prevailed.191 Another dimension of this 
tension was the perceptions of the Turkish elite about the diminishing of Turkey’s 
geopolitical importance for the West after the Cold War and their desire to adopt an 
active foreign policy in the region, especially in Iraq. 
The invasion of Kuwait by Iraqi forces in August 1990 and intervention by 
the coalition forces disturbed all regional and international balances. Anti-western 
Iran stood by the US-led alliance (including Egypt, Saudi Arabia….) during the 
crisis and war against Iraq which was perceived as a sign of normalization of its 
relations with Turkey and the West. At the same time sequence a major 
improvement was realized in Soviet-Iranian relations. President Ali Akbar 
Rafsanjani visited Moscow in 1989 and signed an agreement, which defined the 
framework for cooperation between the two states that helped the improvement of 
relations dramatically.192 
But post-Gulf war developments proved that Iran did not divert from its 
ambitions and pragmatic policies such as giving support to Christian Armenia 
against the Shia Azeri population. Accordingly Tehran’s siding with the West was a 
conditional necessity. American military existence in Turkey, operations in Northern 
Iraq by Turkish Armed Forces (TAF), struggle for influence in Central Asia and the 
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Caucasus, Iranian support for PKK and Islamist militants in Turkey and the Kurdish 
problem continued to be the main topics of strain between the two countries.  
In this premature and uncertain international and regional environment the 
threat perceptions of the two countries determined the path they would pursue in 
policy-making.  
3.3.1. Threat Perceptions of Iran 
Since its declaration, the Revolutionary regime pronounced all Western and 
so-called Western oriented countries as enemies due to political and sui-generis 
identity reasons. After the Iraqi war and Cold war this inclination did not change 
because of definitional characteristics of the regime. (Figure 1 for the security 
structure of Iran) 
  The demise of the Soviet Union was a paradox for Iran. While it eliminated 
the real threat to Iranian independence, political instability in the newly independent 
republics along its northern border created severe concern in Iran which created a 
Russian effect in Iranian politics. 
There are approximately 22 million Azerbaijanis in Iran and Tehran feared 
that the former Soviet Azerbaijan could become a magnet for Iran’s Azerbaijanis. 
Olson argues that Iran’s great concern with regard to its Kurdish question is 
Ankara’s dissatisfaction with its efforts to cooperate in controlling the PKK will 
impel Turkey to encourage Turkish nationalism among its Azerbaijani population.193 
However, Turkey, in spite of the existence of a very large Turkish minority in Iran, 
never attempted to gain influence over and/or instigate this community thanks to its 
concerns about upsetting Tehran, which is a sign of consistency and cordiality.  
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Iran evaluates the allocation of U.S. military forces in the Gulf countries194 
as a threat, and Tehran would, therefore, like to see an end to the U.S. presence in 
the region. NATO bases in Turkey were evaluated in the same context by Iranian 
officials and constituted another rhetorical instrument for Iran in bilateral relations. 
The US intervention in Iraq in 2003, capture of Saddam Hussein and lack of a 
central administration caused chaos and instability in Iraq. Tehran is concerned 
about the establishment of an independent Kurdish state in Northern Iraq and its 
repercussions in Iranian territory since it has a great number of Kurdish population 
within its borders.  
Increasing unemployment, uncompensated agonies of the Iraqi war, 
deteriorating living standards and diminishing GDP per capita (much less than the 
Shah era) figured a lack of confidence among Iranian citizens.  The Iranian regime 
was unsuccessful in bestowing wealth to its people with ideological rhetoric alone. 
Confidence towards the regime has been questioned. 
3.3.2. Threat Perceptions of Turkey 
The new international structure of the post-Col War era, and the increasing 
PKK activities stemming from the power vacuum in northern Iraq, caused an 
adjustment in Turkey’s threat perceptions. In view of that, the 1992 National 
Security Policy Document changed Turkey’s previous defense concept, which was 
prepared against the Soviet Union and Greece, and labeled the primary threat as 
separatist PKK terrorism with sources in the southern neighbors of Turkey, namely 
Syria, Iraq and Iran.195  
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Figure 3.1. Iran’s Security Organization196 
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Developments after the 1990 Gulf campaign could lead to the fragmentation 
of Iraq and establishment of a Kurdish state in the region which is nightmare 
scenario for Turkey.197 The territorial integrity of Iraq has always been the key issue 
when referring to Turkey’s foreign policy toward that country. While Iran acted in 
conformity with Turkish policy-makers on the issue of Iraq’s territorial integrity, it 
supported separatist Kurdish fractions against the Saddam regime and there is no 
obstacle in pursuing the same policy against Turkey for Iran.  
Turkey did not perceive the Islamic regime as a major threat against itself in 
the religious realm. Ankara’s concern about Tehran is the continuation of Islamic 
propaganda against Turkey and its support for Islamist militants and PKK in Turkey. 
With the election of Rafsanjani, Iran seemed to conduct a more moderate policy 
toward its neighbors. Improving relations with Saudi Arabia and the policy of 
lowering the volume of revolutionary rhetoric did not dissuade concerns about Iran 
and its unchanging ambitions to expand the revolution.  
3.4. Redefining the Relationship 
In the post-Cold War period it is detectable that the main drive of the two 
countries in their respective policies is to curb the other’s sphere of influence. 
During this period Iran tried hard to break the “dual containment” policy and 
embargo of America by improving its relations with Europe (in the form of critical 
dialogue)198 and to export the regime to Central Asia and Caucasus.  
                                                                                                                                          
 
197 Ramazan Gözen.”Kuzey Irak Sorunu” in İdris Bal eds, 21. Yüzyılın Eşiğinde Türk Dış Politikası 
(Turkish Foreign Policy at the Beginning of the 21th Century) cited in İsmail Selvi. Countering State-
Supported Terrorism: The PKK and Turkish Foreign Policy Towards the Middle East. Bilkent 
University (Unpublished MA Thesis, July 2003), p.118 
 
198The policy of critical dialogue which is adopted by EU towards Iran emphasizes the preservation of 
political and economic relations with pressure on Tehran for the restriction on nuclear efforts and 
more freedom in Iran and trying to dissipate the government’s harsh control over the society and 
press.  
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As for Turkey, being exposed to terrorism by PKK and instability in northern 
Iraq taught Ankara that the NATO shield in Middle East is not reliable in the post-
Cold War environment. Naturally, security concerns made Turkey come close to 
Israel who shares the same type of administration, democratic values and threat 
perceptions in the region in larger perspective.  
Within this wider structure from the death of Khomeini in June 1989 to the 
beginning of Gulf war in August 1990 was a transition period in relations between 
Iran and Turkey. During this time, just as the previous decade, both countries tried 
to lower tensions for the sake of stability and economic growth. Especially Iran tried 
to dilute its radical speeches under Rafsanjani.  
3.4.1. The Iranian Support for PKK 
Iran’s support for PKK (Partiye Karkaren Kürdistan) separatists constituted 
the major issue of strain between Iran and Turkey in the 1990s. In essence, the basic 
ideology of the Iranian regime does not limit the administration in using unlawful 
methods against Turkey while the quality of state and regime besides elite groups in 
Turkey does allow these kinds of covert policies against Iran.  
Iran allowed PKK to open a bureau in Urumiya.199 PKK also connected with 
the Kurdish groups in northern Iraq with Iranian help, especially Barzani’s KDP 
(Kurdistan Democratic Party) to facilitate actions from their camps in the 
preliminary phases. It is widely known that the PKK had facilities in Iran200 as they 
did in Syria and Iraq201 at that time, many of which still exist.  
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Although the Turkish side delivered evidence of the incidents and camps to 
Iranian officials many times, Iran did not change its position and continued to 
reiterate that Iran had nothing to do with the terrorist attacks that occurred in 
Turkey. Iranian officials criticized the Turkish government, particularly the Prime 
Minister Demirel for his statements that Iran supported “Kurdish terrorists” 
operating in Turkey.202 In 1996, a report by the Border Security Commission of the 
Turkish National Assembly stated that Iran gave a ‘green card’ to PKK members to 
utilize medical care and to transport in Iran freely. 203 
Regarding northern Iraq, Iran always had anxieties about Turkey’s cross-
border operations and perceived these operations as a sign of the hidden agenda of 
Turkey about Mosul and Kirkuk. Thus, Iran supported PKK to prevent Turkey’s 
possible initiatives in the region.204 Within the same context, following the 
independence of Azerbaijan, PKK activities escalated as of 1992 in Kars and Ağrı 
near the Azerbaijan and Iranian border. Despite the protocol signed with Turkey on 
September 30, 1993 in which they assured to prevent activities against the other in 
their respective territories, Iran maintained its covert support for PKK as a simple 
but powerful instrument. Even in some reports of Turkish National Intelligence 
Agency (NIA) and TAF iterated that some Iranian officers participated in the 
planning of terrorist activities of PKK which escalated the tension.205 
The main purpose of Iran was to destabilize Turkey’s southern regions in 
order to hinder any energy project that excludes itself. Iran does not limit itself to 
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PKK in covert actions and supports other anti-Turkish and Islamic terrorist 
organizations while pursuing the policy of playing deaf and dumb.206  
3.4.2. Ideological Discrepancies  
Right from its declaration, Iranian Revolutionary regime perceived the 
secular and democratic Turkish regime as a threat because it was a NATO ally, a 
friend of ‘Great Satan’ U.S. and had good relations with the state of Israel. Iranian 
attitude did not change during the 1980s. The new regime’s “ideology of Islamic 
revolutionary universalism is anathema to Turkey’s secular nationalism”.207 
According to Revolutionary Iran, exportation of the regime208 to neighboring 
countries was a means of consolidation of its national security in the region. Even 
the pragmatic Rafsanjani and his successor Khatami has little to do with the issue 
since the hardliners dominated the decision-making processes on foreign affairs and 
national security. 
Though a revolution of Iranian kind in Turkey is always out of question due 
to sectarian differences and people’s confidence in the democratic values, Iran tried 
to influence the Turkish community through radio programs which can be received 
in Eastern Turkey.209 A major example of Iran’s support for Islamist movements is 
asking for lifting ban on “Turban”210 after the Constitutional court’s decision of the 
                                                 
206 For more information on Turkey’s war against terrorism see Nur Bilge Criss, “Developments in 
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ban in Turkey.211  The Turban crisis in 1989 reached in a peak that Ankara recalled 
its Ambassador in Tehran for consultation and Iran immediately retaliated in kind.  
Another problem was the question of Iranian refugees in Turkey. 
Immediately after the revolution about two million regime dissidents came to 
Turkey many of whom used Turkey as a transit route to Europe and settled there. All 
in all Turkey did not accept any refugees in large numbers from its Eastern borders 
since the declaration of the Turkish Republic.212 It is estimated that approximately 
600.000 Iranian live in Turkey at present and the operations against leaders of 
dissidents in Turkey by Iranian secret service was a source of tension between the 
two countries. The killing of four Kurdish dissident leaders in Berlin at a restaurant 
named “Mikonos” 213 is proof regarding the unchanging Iranian policy of going after 
dissidents. 
During this phase the murder of some prominent Turkish journalists, for 
instance Uğur Mumcu, in a car bomb at Ankara on January 24, 1993, was one of the 
most important incidents. İsmet Sezgin then interior minister of Turkey linked the 
murder of Mumcu to the organizations located in Iran and then President Süleyman 
Demirel talked about “certain powers” behind the killings and efforts to create 
divisions in Turkey.214 At the same time there were reports on Iranian support for 
the Hizbullah terrorist organization which was involved in many murders in 
southeastern Turkey. Consequently the Iranian Prime Minister Hasan Habibi 
canceled his visit to Turkey in February 1993.215 Iran’s support for Islamist terror 
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was also condemned after Turkish Hizbullah members were apprehended by Turkish 
security forces in February 2000, and confessed tıo ties with Iran. 
Though these incidents never resulted in a diplomatic break between the two 
countries, their opposing ideologies clearly made Iran and Turkey uneasy 
neighbors.216 
3.5. Khatami and His New Foreign Policy Orientation 
President Mohammad Khatami took office in August 1997, and then 
Iran’s foreign relations have undergone some kind of transformation, even though he 
does not have policymaking fully under his control. 217 In Iran the formal structure of 
power distribution suggests that the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Seyed Ali 
Khamenei, has ultimate authority. 218 The most important political problem of Iran is 
the struggle for power over the country’s economy, culture and public between the 
hard-liners and reformists. Hard-liners have control over policies of WMD, Peace 
Process and support for terrorism. Khatami has been blocked by mullahs and had 
been unsuccessful in fulfilling his aim of a relatively freer Iran. 219 
Khatami stated that, "Our revolution is a revolution of words"220 implying 
the Islamic Revolution. By stating that, he well understood the shortcomings of the 
Islamic regime in economic and cultural domains and the urgency of dialogue 
between regional states to stabilize the cosmopolitan region. As a general policy of 
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openness, President Khatami is calling for more individual freedoms, an independent 
media and judiciary, and hopes to restore normal relations with regional states. 221 
President Khatami favors a dialogue of civilizations rather than a clash of 
civilizations and has hoped to improve relations with the U.S, E.U, and with the 
potential rival Saudi Arabia. In support of these efforts, Khatami visited Saudi 
Arabia, Syria, Qatar, the Vatican City, Italy and France. For him, detente, dialogue of 
civilizations, and a host of other clever approaches have aimed to rehabilitate Iran's 
reputation in the West and soothe its troubled regional ties in general.222 
This policy direction had also impact on Turkey-Iranian relations under 
Khatami administration since 1997. According to Gökhan Çetinsaya, relations 
between Turkey and Iran have never been better than today. 223 In the same respect, 
then Under-Secretary of Turkish Foreign Ministry, Faruk Loloğlu, met President 
Mohammad Khatami on June 24, 2001 in Tehran and said Turkey's cooperation with 
third countries, namely the U.S. and Israel, is not regarded as a threat to Iran. He 
added that Turkey's bilateral cooperation with these countries merely aimed to 
establish peace and security in the region 224 to dissuade exaggerated Iranian 
concerns. Again, referring to the ups and downs in the bilateral relations, then Turkish 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, İsmail Cem, said Iranian and Turkish officials have always 
made efforts to find ways to lift obstacles against the expansion of bilateral relations225 
during his Tehran visit in 2000. 
President Khatami also diverted from the rhetoric of some critical policies 
such as exporting the regime to neighbouring countries. But that does not mean a 
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total change in Iranian foreign policies since hard-liners dominate and easily affect 
the decision-making process of Iran.  
Even though President Khatami asserted that the Turkish-Israeli alignment 
“provokes the feelings of Islamic world”,226 his efforts and ambitions for a more 
opportunistic Iranian foreign policy, developing relations with Turkey especially on 
the energy sphere manifest that there are many more critical determinants in 
pragmatic Turkish-Iranian relations than Turkish-Israeli alignment. Defence Minister 
Mohammed Furuzande, for example, blasted Turkey for its "cooperation with the 
Zionist regime, which is threatening the Islamic world." Iran's spiritual leader, 
Ayatollah `Ali Akbar Khamene'i, drew even more alarming conclusions, finding that 
these agreements with the Jewish state meant that Turkey "had bid farewell to 
Islamic traditions."227  The backlashes against the alignment were generally restricted 
to the verbal domain as been iterated earlier.  
Despite the rhetorical accusations by Iranian officials pertain to Turkish-
Israeli alignment and its severe impacts on Turkish-Iranian relations, Iran started to 
export gas from its southern depots to Turkey via pipelines in 2000 and when 
Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül gave a speech on the necessity of 
democratization of Iran during the 30th session of Organization of Islamic Countries 
(OIC) foreign ministers conference in Tehran in May 2003, Iranian officials declared 
nothing but to agree with Gül. However, during the same organization, Iranian 
President Mohammed Khatami continued to comment on “Israeli state terrorism” 
                                                 
226 Efraim Inbar, “Regional implications of Israeli-Turkish Strategic Partnership”  Middle East Review 
of International Affairs Vol.5, No.2  (Summer 2001), p.30 
227 Keyhan (Tehran), Apr. 24, 1997, as cited in FBIS-NES, Apr. 24, 1997. 
 83 
against Palestinians.228 Beginning to analyze the pragmatic relations between Iran 
and Israel it can be argued from the picture above that Iranian position vis-à-vis 
Turkish-Israeli alignment was cautious  
3.6. Israeli-Iranian Relations in Historical Perspective 
Since its establishment the state of Israel pursued close relations with Iran 
till the Islamic Revolution. After the establishment of the state of Israel, Ben Gurion 
hoped to develop the “peripheral pact” theory and create a ring of adversaries around 
the Arab countriesPrior to the Revolution, Iran and Israel had been de facto allies in 
the Middle East. The main purpose of the Israeli relationship with Iran was the 
development of a pro-Israel and anti-Arab policy on the part of Iranian officials 
Following the cessation of oil supply by Soviets to Israel, Iran became the oil 
supplier of Israel in 1973.229 
Intelligence sharing, training of Savak (Iran Secret Service) officers by Israel 
and cooperation in aiding Mullah Mustafa Barzani’s Kurdish rebels fighting the Iraqi 
Baathist regime can be counted as realms of cooperation. Collaboration between 
Israel and Iran touched many other fields, including oil, trade, air transport, and 
various forms of technical assistance. But their most important mutual interest was in 
the military sphere. Generally speaking Arab-Iranian and Israeli-Arab relations 
played a determinant role in Israeli-Iranian relations, bringing them closer.  
3.6.1. Relations with the Revolutionary Regime 
With the breakdown of law and order after the Shah’s departure in 1978, 30 
years of Israeli-Iranian friendship was wounded severely. Immediately after the 
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Revolution, Israel was declared as the “Little Satan” by the Revolutionary Regime. 
Khomeini did not agree to a continuation of relations with Israel and put an end to 
this legacy. With the establishment of an Islamic republic in Iran, the Israeli Embassy 
in Tehran was given to the Palestinians.230 
Witnessing Iran’s predicament in its war with Iraq, Israel benefited from the 
situation by selling large sums of U.S. originated weapons to Tehran. A tacit 
agreement was made with the Islamic Republic: in exchange for military equipment, 
Iranian Jews would be allowed to leave Iran.231 Many Jews are extracted from Iran 
via Pakistan and later Austria.  
The critical point is that how a state can declare the other as “threat for its 
existence” while obtaining military aid from the latter? The traces of Iranian 
pragmatic polices can be detected in this trade with Israel no matter what type of 
administration rules the country. This situation manifests some resemblances to 
Iran’s relations with Turkey in that despite declaring Turkey as an ally of West and 
its voice in the region, Tehran continued to trade with Turkey for its daily needs 
especially during its war with Iraq. As for the arms sales issue, Israel lost no time 
supplying the new Khomeini regime with small quantities of arms, even after the 
seizure of the U.S. embassy. Arms market experts have put the total value at more 
than $500 million a year, including aircraft parts, artillery and ammunition.232 
According to Jonathan Marshall, though Israel, along with the United 
States, suffered a grievous loss with the fall of the Shah, its leaders concluded that 
lasting geo-political interests would eventually triumph over religious ideology and 
produce an accommodation between Tel Aviv and Tehran. The onset of the Iran-Iraq 
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war in 1980 gave Israeli leaders a special incentive to keep their door open to the 
Islamic rulers in Iran: the two non-Arab countries now shared a common Arab 
enemy. As then Israeli Defense Minister, Ariel Sharon told the Washington Post in 
May 1982, justifying Israeli arms sales to Tehran, "Iraq is Israel's enemy and we 
hope that diplomatic relations between us and Iran will be renewed as in the past."233 
Four months later he told a Paris press conference, "Israel has a vital interest in the 
continuing of the war in the Persian Gulf, and in Iran's victory." Such views were not 
Sharon's alone; then Prime Ministers Itzhak Shamir (Likud) and Shimon Peres 
(Labor) shared them too.234 
How does one explain this contradictory behavior of the Iranian government? 
R.K.  Ramazani argues that the character of challenge by Revolutionary Regime and 
the responses to this challenge by other Middle Eastern countries can be deemed 
multidimensional. He continues that “an exclusive emphasis on the military, 
ideological, or political aspects of these developments will not adequately explain 
them”.235 Thus, Iran did not hesitate to purchase U.S.-made Israeli arms when its 
security imperatives following the Iraqi invasion compelled Tehran to do so with its 
general policy of pragmatism.  
While Israel has been supplying Iran with arms, it has not hesitated to use 
force to protect itself form terrorist attacks which derived from Lebanon with the 
help of the Revolutionary Regime. In 1982 Israel conducted a military operation in 
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Lebanon against Hezbollah killing almost 2500 civilians, including women and 
children.236   
It can be argued that the direction of Israeli-Iranian relations had been 
shaped by the Islamic and Zionist ideologies and realpolitik of the Middle East. Their 
relations have been marked by hostility and absolute conflict when Islamic and 
Zionist ideologies came to the surface. When security necessities marked an urgent 
requirement, the relationship between the two countries shifted towards realpolitik.  
These kinds of irregular and pragmatic relations dominate the general direction of 
Israeli-Iranian relations.  
In the same are Iran enhanced its economic relations with Turkey to import 
its daily goods and other non-war commodities. Despite iterating Turkey as a tool of 
Western countries, giving a shelter to PKK and rescuing it from a total annihilation, 
supporting other fundamentalist organization Tehran denied all allegations officially 
and tried to benefit from all aspects of bilateral relations. This policy reflects the 
political culture of the Revolutionary regime and Turkish-Israeli alignment is not an 
exception for Tehran.  
Besides, oil and gas resources in the Middle East and probable future 
energy routes in the region are on the top of the Iranian political agenda. Tehran does 
not want to be ousted from the energy routes. Knowing that the recrimination of the 
Zionist regime enhances its domestic posture but she needs Ankara’s support to 
connect its energy resources with feasible international transportation routes, Tehran 
adopted different policies against Ankara and Tel-Aviv. Opening of long-delayed gas 
pipeline between Turkey and Iran in 2000 is a clear sign of this. 
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3.6.2. Relations in the post-Cold war era  
These two states declared themselves as the most important enemies 
respectively with verbal recriminations and allocate each other at the top of threat 
perceptions. But, relating to Israel, President Khatami calls for "sober and pragmatic 
analysis," presumably free of conspiracy theories, aware of the futility of calling the 
Jewish State a racist, terrorist regime.237 The post-Cold war bilateral relations have 
also been dominated by this policy tendency. In the post-Cold war era the Iran-
supported terrorist organizations in Lebanon, Israeli-Arab conflict, namely the 
Palestinian issue and WMD have constituted main topics of strain between the two 
countries.   
Possibly, WMD is the most important issue of all, regarding the importance 
of proliferation in the Middle East region. Israel, with the U.S., accused Iran of 
struggling to attain nuclear arms and intend to use against the Zionist regime. But is 
it really Israel behind the ambition of Iran to obtain nuclear arms? Or do Iran and 
Israel perceive an impending nuclear threat from each other respectively?  This is 
much related to the claim that Turkish-Israeli alignment has been formed against Iran 
and for using Turkey’s airspace for reconnaissance in need of a retaliation or 
preemptive missile attack on Israel since Israel perceives a nuclear missile threat 
from Iran, even  though all of the above are rhetorical as of yet.   
3.6.3. Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) 
It has long been known that Iranian representatives and sympathizers abroad 
point to the need to counter Israel’s alleged nuclear arsenal and its nuclear monopoly 
in the Middle East as a justification for its pursuit of nuclear weapons. According to 
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Brenda Shaffer, despite the Iranian rhetoric, the main strategic rationale for the 
Iranian nuclear program has not been to counter Israel’s nuclear arsenal, but to 
bolster its role as a regional power and to counter Iraq, Iran’s principal threat until 
2003.238 It is an undeniable fact that, Iran learned much from Saddam’s chemical 
weapon attacks on Iran during the 1980-1987 war, and this experience convinced 
Tehran that international instruments and guarantees are only useful if one is a 
friend of the Great Powers.239  Additionally, Iran is located in a nuclear 
neighborhood—next to Russia, Pakistan, and India—and seeks to become an 
important regional power. The fact that the Iranian nuclear weapons program started 
under the shah’s regime, which at the time maintained excellent cooperation with 
the United States and Israel, is solid evidence that Israel has not been the main 
motivating factor for Iranian nuclear ambitions according to Shaffer.240  
Shaffer argues that, with the removal of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq 
through an American intervention, much of the original strategic motivation for 
Tehran to acquire nuclear weapons has been lost.241 The current strategic rationale, 
however, may have changed, and it seems that in 2003 Tehran even presented its 
progress in its nuclear program as a way to deter the United States from creating a 
fate for the Iranian government similar to that of Hussein’s regime. In 2003, Iran 
announced that it relinquished the uranium-enrichment program, which is vital for 
attaining nuclear capacity, in a meeting with Foreign Ministers of Germany, France 
and Britain. The Foreign Minister of Iran, Khemal Kharrazi stated that Iran is ready 
for full transparency on its nuclear program about which U.S. and other western 
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countries have suspicions. Iran also accepted to sign the additional protocol of NPT 
on uninformed inspections in 2003. 242 
Ehud Springzak argues that Iran has no reason to launch a nuclear attack on 
Israel. The Iranians, he says, "are far more rational and pragmatic than depicted in 
the Israeli media" and are well aware of Israeli superiority in unconventional 
weapons and missiles.243 According to him the Israeli government exploits the 
alleged Iranian threat to account for its huge military spending. Israeli defense and 
military officials are more pessimistic than their civilian counterparts, seeing a 
nuclear Iran towards Israel as the prime target.  
In fact, Iran’s alleged pursuit of nuclear weapons has made it a more likely 
target of Israel. Tehran always suspected an Israeli covert operation against its 
facilities as Israel made against the Osirek nuclear facility of Iraq in 1981 to curb 
Iraq’s nuclear capability. An operation to destroy Iran's nuclear capabilities if 
necessary was under consideration, according to Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz. 
Speaking in Persian in February 2003 on Radio Israel, Mofaz said that if the need 
arises to destroy Iran's nuclear capability, "the necessary steps will be taken so that 
Iranian citizens will not be harmed"244 which indicate that Israel pursued its rhetoric 
on Iran’s nuclear capacity.  For the moment, those who would still downplay the 
Iranian threat argue that Tehran's unconventional capabilities remain problematic 
and/or that its willingness to attack Israel is assuredly very low.245 
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Iran is a member of all the major multilateral disarmament agreements 
currently in existence,246 and has an active role in international negotiations even 
though some argue that these are cover actions. Although the Nuclear-Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) allows transfers of nuclear technology for peaceful 
purposes to non-nuclear weapon states, the United States has opposed Russian-
Iranian nuclear cooperation. The Clinton administration even signed a bill to force 
Russia to stop its contributions to the Iranian program in May 1995.247  
On the other hand, the feeble economic situation and the incapacity of the 
Islamic Regime in fulfilling the role of “model for all Muslim states” failed and so 
did Tehran’s prestige. Thus, domestically, the regime seems to be using the nuclear 
program as a nationalistic rallying issue and a way for the desperately weak regime 
to project power.  
Apart from being used in state-level conflicts, a serious concern is that these 
kinds of weapons could be a more serious threat in the event that they are obtained 
and used by terrorist organizations. Accordingly, Iran is a source of anxiety for its 
well-known support for terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah and Hamas.248 
The main concern of Turkey should be the attainment of chemical and 
biological weapons by terrorist organizations because of the usefulness of these 
weapons and the difficulty of control. As Kibaroglu warns, such an attack as the 
Aum Shinrikyo sect realized in the Tokyo metro in 1995, which killed and disabled 
many, can be made by terrorist groups to realize their aims.249 
                                                 
246 Peter Jones,  “Iran’s Threat Perceptions and Arms Control Policies” The Nonproliferation Review 
(Fall 1998), p.40 
247 Greg J. Gerardi and Maryam Aharinejad, “An Assesment of Iran’s Nuclear Facilities”, The 
Nonproliferation Review. (Spring-Summer 1995), p. 207 
248 Mustafa Kibaroğlu. “ Iran Nükleer Bir Güç mü Olmak İstiyor?” (Is Iran Going Nuclear?) Avrasya 
Dosyası  Vol.5, No.3 (Fall 1999), p.272 
249 Mustafa Kibaroğlu. “ Iran Nükleer Bir Güç mü Olmak İstiyor?”  (Is Iran Going Nuclear?), Avrasya 
Dosyası Vol.5, No.3  (Fall 1999), p.273 
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As for conventional forces, Iran is far from challenging either Turkey, which 
has the largest army in the region, or Israel, whose military technology is coveted by 
all states except U.S. Iran’s powerful army was exterminated by Iraq during war 
years and the embargo by U.S. impeded re-supplying its loses in conventional terms. 
While Tehran tries hard to bridge the gap with Soviet-Originated weapons, 
economic constrains hampered its efforts to a considerable degree. That is why 
Tehran revived its nuclear program in the middle of the 1980s. Iran's offensive 
options are limited. Its ground forces do not pose a threat to any of its neighbors, due 
to their small size and poor condition.  
While some of Turkish officials declared their anxiety about Tehran with 
nuclear power, the WMD did not engage the top of Turkey’s security agenda. 
Turkey bought some Popeye-I and Popeye-II type missiles (air-to-air and air-to-
surface) form Israel through its alignment. These missiles were not produced to 
counter a missile threat. However Tel-Aviv refused the participation of Turkey in its 
missile shield project which will consist of 500-km-ranged Delilah missiles.  This 
clearly indicates that Israel and Turkey perceives Iran’s alleged nuclear threat from 
different dimensions. Conclusively, these differences in perceptions cause Turkey to 
put its bilateral relations with Iran to an independent course from that with Israel. 
All in all, it is hard to argue that Turkish-Israeli alignment had a severe impact on 
Turkish-Iranian relations. 
3.7. A Brief Re-evaluation 
The pragmatic and ever-shifting relations between Iran and Israel, the 
incapacity of nuclear assault of Iran without known target and exaggerated rhetoric 
from Israel with the possible intention of legalizing war with any regional state 
having nuclear capacity, so that it can pursue its nuclear monopoly, reveal that Iran 
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and Israel do not perceive each other as primary threat. In accordance with this 
argument a nuclear war or an intended Israeli attack on Iran’s instillations does not 
seem probable and logical in the near future. Given the pragmatic character of both 
states’ foreign policies they probably will be able to find ways to manage 
controversial issues. The rhetoric of “existential threat” of each state is much related 
to their domestic policies. Since neither state is on the verge of war, an alliance 
against one, in this case Iran, of other regional powers such as Turkey nor is Israel 
out of question. 
  In that respect, as they did in the past, Turkey and Iran will pursue their 
relations despite the problematic and crisis-prone nature of Turkish-Iranian relations 
independent from Turkey’s relations with Israel. The coming of Khatami and 
reformists to power also signals the “lowering the tension” between Iran and its 
neighbors. Seeing that it is the best way to prolong the life of the revolutionary 
regime, Tehran tries to adapt to the new international environment to break its 
isolation. Turkey-Iranian relations has continuity in terms of geography, history, 
religious differences, strategic and geopolitical values, energy routes and conditions 
stemming therefrom despite regime change. That’s way the Islamic regime had to 
derail from its initial uncompromising attitude and put aside the classical Islamist 
rhetoric in order to develop its relations with regional states. However it is an 
undeniable fact that the changing course of Iranian political life in the mid-1990s 
makes it more complicated to asses the real impact of Turkish-Israeli alignment on 
Turkish-Iranian relations. 
Given this picture, the argument that Turkish-Israeli alignment was formed 
against Iran has been considerably refuted. The pragmatic relations between these 
three countries impede polarization in the region. On the contrary, they benefit from 
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each other as Iran bought weapons from Israel in the 1980s and Turkey traded 
heavily with Iran during same years. Turkey still buys natural gas from Iran and 
transportation of Turkmen natural gas via Iran and Turkey to the Mediterranean is a 
much discussed subject.  
After the Turkish-Israeli alignment relations between Turkey and Iran did 
not rupture or change dramatically. On the contrary Khatami overrode the futile 
issues such as “regime exportation” to some extent to enhance bilateral relations. 
However, the domestic capacity of reformists and their efficiency in decision-
making processes are limited. Hard-liners are still powerful enough to dominate the 
issues of foreign policy and security of the country. 
As has been iterated above, the subject of WMDs is rather controversial. 
There are still hot debates on Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Logically there is an 
unbridgeable gap between Iran and Israel’s nuclear capabilities. Iran is aware of a 
more efficient retaliation from Israel if Tehran dares a nuclear attack on Israel. As 
for Turkey, while Iran could achieve a limited success with a missile attack, it does 
not have the conventional capacity to resist the Turkish Armed Forces (the largest 
and most powerful Army of the region) with its limited conventional abilities.  
All in all there is not much reason for an alignment between Turkey and 
Israel against Iran. It is an undeniable fact that Iranian officials condemned Turkey 
for its alignment with Israel. However, their reflections can be deemed as an 
instrument for domestic politics. It is most convenient to asses this alignment as a 
cooperative structure on various topics between two regional states without a 
specific target in the region. 
 
 
 94 
CHAPTER IV: 
CONCLUSION 
 
With the end of the Cold war a world conjuncture based on bipolarity 
disappeared. Traditional alliance formations depending on the patron-client 
relationship vanished. This kind of a transformation resulted in the reorientation of 
threat and opportunity perceptions of all states. The changing international 
environment compelled states to find ways to tackle their own problems with their 
respective capabilities. They had limited freedom of maneuverability during the Cold 
war years due to strict polarization.  
 The balancing/bandwagoning dichotomy was used to predict and explain the 
alliance behaviors of states in the Cold War era. But either balancing or 
bandwagoning concepts has problems in explaining post-Cold War orientations of 
states. In general these concepts define a state’s behavior in the event of an 
existential threat.  The threat was the main motivation of governments in determining 
their maneuver. Accordingly, Turkey joined NATO to avoid Soviet threat and to 
benefit from its allies’ defense capabilities. This can be identified as pure balancing. 
On the contrary, in contemporary globalizing world order economic interests not 
existential threat mainly determine the states’ behaviors. The absence of strict 
bipolarity enables states to pursue multifaceted policies. NATO’s diminishing 
popularity and changing character represents the problematic and obsolete nature of 
balancing and bandwagoning in the post-Cold War era. 
   The post-Cold War era also supplies regional states with alternatives to find a 
way to improve their relations with neighbors or precipitate the already-formed 
relations in the absence of the Cold war and adopt different methods from that of 
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alliance limitations while tackling their security needs. Many states found themselves 
in richness of alternatives pertaining to their foreign policy in conformity with their 
geographic location, demography and the level of development. They had the 
opportunity to choose the best alternative primarily to pursue their national interest. 
The Turkish-Israeli relations in the post-Cold war era, especially the 1996 
Military Cooperation Agreement and developing cooperative relations in its 
aftermath, in the context of multipolar world order, enables states to pursue a varied 
foreign policy. While many social scientists and officials call the Turkish-Israeli 
cooperation an alliance, the term “alignment” which is identified with non-binding 
but cooperative characteristics and enhances Turkey’s room for maneuver is more 
suitable than binding alliances when defining the nature of Turkish-Israeli relations. 
Turkey, with this alignment, not only demonstrated willingness and ability to follow 
its interests in the region but Ankara was also able to exert influence in the region 
which can be attested by to reactions to Turkish foreign policy behavior in the 
region. 
There were many reasons for Turkey to establish a sui generis cooperation 
with Israel in the late 1990s. The Middle East region has attained a particular 
importance for the multi-faceted Turkish foreign policy with the changing threat 
perceptions of Ankara from north to south in the early 1990s. The power vacuum in 
Northern Iraq since the 1990 Kuwait campaign which paved the way for a powerful 
PKK, ongoing water debacle with Syria and its backing for PKK along with Iran 
were the main reasons of Turkey’s shifting policy. Additionally, the definition of 
interests diverged in the west and Turkey regarding the Middle East, causing some 
uncertainty and mistrust between them in post-Cold war era. 250 On the other hand, in 
                                                 
250Comment by Prof. Meliha Benli Altunışık during her conference in Ankara University, 18.02.2004  
 96 
the eyes of Western countries Turkey seems to play a more important role in the 
region, enhancing its strategic value despite the difference in interests. 
Moreover there were also some positive factors as the announcement of 
Declarations of Principles (DOP) in the Madrid Peace Process which started in 
October 1991 and removed the impediments before Turkish-Israeli 
rapprochement.251 But the most important motivation for Turkey to boost its strategic 
relations with Israel was the PKK. By the year 1992, separatist PKK terrorism 
substituted for the former northern menace as the primary threat against the security 
and territorial integrity of Turkey and led to the revision of the Turkish national 
defense concept. Israel did not respond to Turkey’s offer to fight against PKK with 
enthusiasm, since Tel-Aviv had enough headaches at that time.  
All these factors instigated Turkey to make a rapprochement with Israel 
beginning from the 1990s which reached a climax in 1996. But this relationship can 
not be depicted as an alliance since the two states did not define a casus foederis,252 
which specifically identifies the situations that will necessitate them to undertake 
military assistance to one another in the event of an armed conflict.253 Generally 
thinking, to avoid polarization in the Middle East, Turkey supported to resolve 
problems through peace talks in conformity with international law, the principle of 
territorial integrity and mutual respect for national unity. Thus a classical alliance 
does not conform to the philosophy of Turkish foreign policy since that venue  may 
have established yet another polarity in the region. 
                                                 
251 Gencer Özcan, “Türkiye-İsrail İlşkileri 50. Yılına Girerken” (Turkish-Israeli Relations in its 50th 
year) in Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi eds. Faruk Sönmezoğlu. (İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 2001), p.168 
252 A stipulation about who will support whom in what contingencies and a secret agenda against third 
states asking for the help of an ally in the event of an aggression by a third state (including military 
attacks). That is a clear sign of why Turkish-Israeli relations can not be categorized as an alliance.  
253 İsmail Selvi, Countering State-Supported Terrorism: The PKK and Turkish Foreign Policy 
Towards the Middle East.(Unpublished Thesis in Bilkent University, July 2003), p.143 
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On the other hand, it can be easily said that the mentioned alignment supplied 
Turkey with considerable room for maneuver. For example the process, at the end of 
which the PKK terrorist leader, Abdullah Öcalan, was captured, was pursued with 
the help of Israel’s various security units both in terms of conventional forces and 
intelligence support. 254 While there have been noteworthy developments in all fields, 
such as trade, tourism and agriculture, the most significant element of developing 
relations between the two countries in the 1990s has been in the military domain. 
The existence of some controversial issues indicates a weakness in the 
discourse of solidarity between the two countries. Currently Israel gives extensive 
support for the Kurdish struggle for independence in northern Iraq.255 According to 
Alon Liel, Israeli Ambassador (Ret), there would be a weak federation in Iraq though 
a separation would not occur. He continues that Northern Iraqi Kurds are friends of 
Israel. While he depicts Turkey as the only regional friend of Israel, Liel warns that 
Turkey should be ready for such phenomenon like a “divided Iraq”. 
Another topic of controversy is the long-discussed water issue. Water has an 
increasing value in Middle East, thus raising the worth of Turkey’s cards in the 
region. Different approaches by Turkey and Israel towards the water issue signify 
that the two countries may part on crucial subjects which refute the claims about 
“strategic alliance” between them.256 Basically, Israel does not want to become 
dependent on Turkey for water as a general policy though it signed a draft agreement 
with Turkey on water supply from Manavgat River. Third, the signing of another 
military agreement between Greece and Israel, which resembles the Israeli-Turkish 
                                                 
254Çevik Bir, “Reflections on Turkish-Israeli Relations and Turkish Security.”,  The Washington 
Institute for Near East Policy, Policywatch 422, 05 December 1999. 
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/watch/index.htm 
255Amikam Nachmani, Turkey: Facing a New Millennium .(Manchester:Manchester University Press, 
2003), p.204 
256Mahmut Bali Aykan, Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Dönemi Ortadoğu’sunda Türkiye’nin İsrail’e Karşı 
Politikası:1991-1998. (Turkey’s Foreign Policy toward Israel in post-Cold War Middle East) 
(İstanbul: Yeditepe University, 2000), p.38 
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military agreement, indicates that Israel does not perceive the Turkish-Israeli 
relations as an alliance due to well-known Turco-Greek disagreements. 
The claim that Iran is the target of the mentioned alignment is a weak 
probability while forcing Iran to redeem its regional policies to some extent. In fact, 
Iranian support to the PKK was not as overt as that of Damascus, and Iranian 
officials always denied their support despite evidence given by Ankara to Tehran 
several times. Hopes for normalization of relations with Tehran are dictated by 
foreign policy and security elites in Ankara who deem cutting relations off with 
Tehran irrational.257 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
257 Meliha Benli Altunışık. “Turkish-Israeli Rapproachment in the post-Cold War era” , Middle 
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